Training, occupations, and the specificity of human capital by Eckardt, Dita
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Training, Occupations, and the Specificity
of Human Capital
Dita Eckardt
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
London, January 2020
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work. The copy-
right of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided
that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my
prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my
belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of
approximately 22, 200 words.
London, January 2020
Dita Eckardt
2
Acknowledgements
I am extremely grateful to my supervisors, Alan Manning and Johannes Spinnewijn,
for their support and guidance throughout my PhD. Their commitment and careful
advice has been invaluable in completing this thesis, and helped me immensely in
developing my research skills.
This thesis has also benefited from discussions with many others. I thank Xavier
Jaravel, Camille Landais, Steve Machin, Guy Michaels, Steve Pischke, Daniel Reck,
Yona Rubinstein and John Van Reenen for helpful comments that substantially
improved my work. Special thanks also to my co-author Karun Adusumilli for many
valuable discussions at different stages of this project.
Throughout the years, my friends and colleagues at the LSE have provided es-
sential support. I especially thank Miguel Bandeira Da Silva, Jay Lee, Wolfgang
Ridinger and Ce´line Zipfel for thoughtful comments on my work and for helping to
make the PhD years so enjoyable. Many thanks also to my other office mates in
room 4.06, Shan Aman-Rana, Patrick Coen, Weihan Ding, Ruth Fortmann, Claudio
Schilter and Chutiorn Tontivanichanon for contributing to a great atmosphere at our
work place. I am grateful to Will Matcham, Kilian Russ and Horng Chern Wong for
providing detailed comments at different stages of my project.
I thank Mark Wilbor for his invaluable advice and administrative support through-
out my PhD. I am grateful to the Research Data Centre at the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency for providing access to the data used in this study. Many thanks
also to Nic Warner and Michael Rose from the IT team at the LSE for helping
with the storage of this data. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the
Economic and Social Research Council.
My time at the LSE has been enriched by my (formerly) London-based friends
from the MSc in Economics. I thank Soren Christian, Chloe´ Delecourt, Lauri
Kyto¨maa, Florian Mockel and David Verdam for providing the necessary distrac-
tion from work and helping make London feel like home.
My deepest gratitude is to those who are closest to me. Thank you, Bernat, for
our countless helpful discussions about my work and, more importantly, for your
love, encouragement and support. I could not have wished for a better partner.
Finally, I thank my parents and my siblings, Veit and Luise, who have always been
there for me and have supported me every step of the way. I am deeply grateful to
have such a wonderful family. This thesis would have not been possible without you.
3
Abstract
Individuals are often trained in a specific field but work in another. This thesis
analyses the returns to different training-occupation combinations. To this end, I
use an administrative employment panel which contains the apprenticeship training
for a large sample of workers in Germany. In this context, 70% of individuals with
at least upper-secondary education hold apprenticeships, and 40% of these work in
occupations they were not trained for. I combine the administrative data with his-
torical data on occupation-specific vacancies to control for selection into trainings
and occupations, and causally identify the returns. To implement the identification
strategy, I set up an augmented Roy model and extend existing control function
approaches to deal with selection in a two-stage, high-dimensional setting. The re-
sults suggest that workers trained in their current occupation earn 10 − 12% more
than workers trained outside their occupation, and that not controlling for selec-
tion leads to substantial negative bias. Intuitively, individuals who choose to work
outside their training are positively selected since their occupation-specific ability
needs to compensate for their lack of training. I find considerable heterogeneity in
the estimated returns and use task content data to provide a microfoundation for
the results in this thesis. My analysis shows that returns across training-occupation
combinations are decreasing in the task distance between the training and the oc-
cupation, suggesting that workers are trained to carry out a specific mix of tasks
and receive larger wage penalties the less applicable the acquired skills are in their
current occupation. Finally, I argue that ex-ante imperfect information may lead to
training choices that are suboptimal ex-post and find that, as a result, 4 − 6% of
wages are foregone for the average worker. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest
that retraining programmes could be very effective in addressing this friction.
This thesis uses the factually anonymous Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies (version
SIAB-R 7510). Data access was provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data
Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the seminal work by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), a large body of literature
in economics has sought to causally identify the returns to education. This work
has focused on estimating the returns to additional years of schooling by running
so-called Mincerian regressions, and using different approaches to overcome biases
typically interpreted as resulting from an omitted ability variable. More recently, a
smaller but growing number of papers explores the heterogeneity of these returns
across college majors, generally concluding that the earnings differentials across fields
of education are large (e.g. Arcidiacono (2004), Altonji et al. (2012)). However,
while much of this literature acknowledges that average returns to major likely mask
important heterogeneity across occupations, we know little about the interactions
between field and occupation. In particular, the wage effects of working outside one’s
field are largely unknown. The present thesis aims to bridge this gap in the literature.
Understanding the differential returns to field-occupation combinations provides new
insights on the value of human capital across occupations. Importantly, it also reveals
key welfare and policy implications since workers could hold suboptimal trainings
ex-post.
The challenges faced in estimating these returns are twofold. Firstly, datasets
recording the field of education and occupation are largely survey-based. Field-
occupation matches are therefore typically classified as “related” or “unrelated” in
a subjective way. Secondly, and more importantly, causal identification requires
accounting for the fact that individuals select into a field, but also subsequently
select into one of many occupations. While descriptive studies show that working in
an occupation related to one’s field of education is associated with higher earnings,
it is unknown to what extent this is driven by selection effects.1 As Altonji et al.
1Examples of studies that find such correlations using subjective classifcations of field-
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(2016) note, the fact that workers select at two stages and the first stage choice
affects the return across options in the second stage poses a formidable estimation
problem.
I address the first challenge by using administrative data on German apprentices.
This data is a sample of German social security records 1975-2010 provided by the
German Federal Employment Agency, containing information on all (un)employment
spells for a randomly selected sample of workers. Importantly, since German appren-
tices are trained in firms for three days a week during their three-year apprenticeship,
the data also contains the occupation workers were working in as apprentices (their
training). As a result, trainings and occupations are objectively recorded, and defin-
ing training-occupation cells is straightforward. The full matrix of combinations has
training as row choice and occupation as column choice, with the same number of
rows and columns. I estimate the returns in these cells.
The German setting is attractive for the present analysis for two other reasons.
Firstly, apprenticeships are the main form of upper- and post-secondary education
in Germany, held by roughly 70% of those who obtained this level of education.
Importantly, an average of 40% of those are employed in an occupation different
from the one they were trained in. Secondly, I observe both the training and later
occupations coded within a former German occupational classification. In contrast
to many international systems, this classification has the advantage of being field-
based such that promotions do not imply occupation changes.
In order to address the second challenge of causal identification, I combine the
employment panel with historical data on occupation-specific apprenticeship vacan-
cies. These vacancies are posted by firms looking to train an apprentice in a specific
occupation. The data contains the universe of apprenticeship vacancies by occupa-
tion, year and region which were posted through local employment agencies between
1978-2010. I show that these vacancies are a close proxy for occupation-specific
labour demand in the economy, and thereby affect earnings. For a particular train-
ing choice, I then use expected vacancies posted in occupations other than the cho-
sen training occupation as instruments. For an occupation choice, I use subsequent
shocks to these expectations in occupations other than the chosen one as instru-
ments. An important advantage of using apprenticeship vacancies instead of actual
job vacancies is that the majority of training firms use the agency channel and cover-
age is large. Using vacancies outside the chosen option is key to satisfy the exclusion
occupation matches include Robst (2007), Nordin et al. (2010), Lemieux (2014), Kinsler & Pavan
(2015) and Ransom (2016).
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restriction. The instruments are highly relevant, confirming the importance of earn-
ings expectations for occupation choices recently documented by Arcidiacono et al.
(2019).
To put structure on the selection problem, I set up an augmented Roy (1951)
model. While the model provides a behavioural justification for the identification
strategy, it does not impose any assumptions for identification, and the empirical
strategy is robust to alternative selection mechanisms. In the given model, workers
choose a training in an initial stage, and subsequently select into an occupation in
every work life period. While training is chosen to maximise expected payoff including
expected wages, occupations are chosen to maximise current payoff including current
wages. Importantly, individuals have imperfect information about future labour
demand and own occupation-specific abilities when choosing a training. As a result,
unexpected changes in labour demand or new information about occupation-specific
abilities may lead to individuals choosing employment outside their training.
Given the high dimensionality of the selection problem, implementing the iden-
tification strategy is not straightforward. A parametric generalisation of the classic
two-step Heckman (1979) approach would not be feasible in this context. Lee (1983)
and Dahl (2002) develop a control function approach that deals with selection in
high-dimensional settings. I extend their approach to two selection stages and im-
plement this using a machine learning technique (random forests) where I predict
training and occupation choices with the instruments.
The returns to different training-occupation combinations naturally depend on
the granularity of the underlying occupation classification. Based on the availability
of the historical vacancy data, I restrict my classification to 13 categories. Using
these, I find the following three main results. Firstly, focusing on effects on versus
off the diagonal, my results suggest that individuals trained and working in the
same occupation on average earn around 10 − 12% more than workers employed
in occupations different from their training. The effect is highly significant and
comparable in magnitude to empirical estimates of the return to a year of schooling
in general, and an additional year as an apprentice in the German system more
specifically (Fersterer et al. (2008)). I find evidence that the return is strongest at
the beginning of a career, but only drops by a couple of percentage points before
stabilising after 12 years of experience. Off-diagonal workers thus only partially
catch up with their co-workers who were trained in their current occupation.
Secondly, not controlling for selection leads to substantial negative bias in the
estimated returns to working on versus off the diagonal such that, observationally, on-
13
diagonal workers have lower earnings. Intuitively, only the more able workers work
off the diagonal as their unobserved occupation-specific ability needs to compensate
for the lack of training. The majority of this bias is visible right after the training,
confirming recent results in the sorting literature that workers sort early in their
careers (Lentz et al. (2018)). However, I also find evidence that the bias becomes
stronger over a career, a result which is in line with the proposed model where
individuals have imperfect information on their occupation-specific ability. As more
information is revealed to workers about these abilities, they decide to work in an
occupation different from their training if the gain in payoff exceeds the cost of lack
of training. As a result, workers on the diagonal are increasingly negatively selected.
Thirdly, my results display considerable heterogeneity. Across trainings, I find
large differences in the average returns to working on versus off the diagonal, and
a strong positive correlation between these estimated returns and the fraction of
workers with the relevant training observed working on the diagonal. In line with the
proposed selection model, relative returns thus appear to be a key determinant of the
selection into occupations. Even within training, there is substantial heterogeneity
in the penalty when working in different occupations. I use the estimated returns
from the full matrix to provide a microfoundation for the results in this thesis by
drawing on the task approach to occupations (Autor et al. (2003), Autor (2013)).
Studies using the task approach consider occupations as task vectors and argue
that the transferability of human capital across occupations depends on how similar
occupations are in terms of their mix of required tasks.2 Based on this theory,
one may expect workers in the present context to incur larger wage penalties, the
more distant the occupation is from the original training. To test this conjecture,
I construct training-occupation distance measures for every training-occupation cell
using survey data on the task content of occupations. In a second step, I regress
the estimated returns for each training-occupation match on these measures. The
results suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in task distance significantly
reduces the return in a training-occupation cell by 4pp. Overall, these findings
provide strong evidence that workers are trained in a specific mix of tasks and face
higher wage penalties, the less applicable the acquired skills are in their current
occupation.
The key friction in the proposed framework is the lack of information about the
2A number of empirical papers confirm this conjecture, showing that wage drops after displace-
ment are larger for workers who move to occupations which are less related to the previous one
(see e.g. Poletaev & Robinson (2008), Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010)).
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labour market and own occupation-specific abilities at the time of training choice.
Two groups of workers are affected by this friction. The first group are off-diagonal
workers. These workers miss out on the return to working on the diagonal. The
second group are workers who are locked into their training. These individuals
work on the diagonal, but would choose a different occupation in the absence of
any on- versus off-diagonal return. My findings suggest that 60% of workers either
work off the diagonal or are locked in, i.e. only 40% of workers hold the optimal
training ex-post. Using these shares, I find that the welfare loss due to the friction is
4− 6% of wages for an average worker. To address the friction, I consider retraining
programmes as a policy instrument. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
these could effectively address the friction for a majority of workers.
From a more general policy perspective, my results also speak to the wider debate
on Germany’s apprenticeship system as a role model. It has often been argued that
the system facilitates labour market entry by providing workers with specialised
skills, thereby leading to low youth unemployment rates. My findings suggest that
while German apprenticeships successfully deliver occupation-specific skills, many
workers cannot fully put these to use in their current occupation.
This thesis contributes to four strands of literature. Firstly, it builds on the
literature on the returns to college majors. Arcidiacono (2004) estimates a dynamic
structural model of college and major choice and concludes that there are large
relative earnings premiums for certain majors. Altonji et al. (2012) and Altonji
et al. (2016) provide a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the
returns to college majors and document earnings differentials that can exceed the
college-high school premium. Similar results are found by Hastings et al. (2013) and
Kirkebøen et al. (2016) who exploit admission cutoffs to majors in Chile and Norway
in a regression discontinuity framework. I contribute to this literature by analysing
the important heterogeneity that returns to fields display across occupations.
In doing so, I consider an additional selection stage, the selection into occu-
pations. To address the challenges arising from the selection into both trainings
and occupations, this thesis contributes to a second strand of literature on high-
dimensional selection models. Heckman & Robb (1985) show that, in single-index
self-selection models, control functions may be written as functions of the propensity
to self-select.3 In multiple-index models, Lee (1983) shows that the selection problem
may be written as a single-index model using highest order statistics, and develops a
3Ahn & Powell (1993) and Das et al. (2003) derive semi-parametric versions of such control
functions.
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parametric control function estimator. Using a similar idea, Dahl (2002) imposes an
index sufficiency assumption to develop a non-parametric control function approach
where the control function becomes a function of a small set of selection probabil-
ities only. I contribute to this literature by extending the Lee/Dahl approach to a
two-stage selection setting, and implementing it using machine learning techniques.
Thirdly, and more generally, this thesis relates to the literature on human capi-
tal specificity. The idea that human capital is specific was first proposed by Becker
(1964) in the context of the firm, and has subsequently been taken to the data to
explore specificity along a number of dimensions such as industry (Neal (1995)), oc-
cupations (Shaw (1984, 1987), Kambourov & Manovskii (2009)) and skills (Poletaev
& Robinson (2008), Guvenen et al. (forthcoming)). Most recently, a strand of this
literature considering the tasks accumulated over a work life suggests that human
capital is partly task-specific, and thus more easily transferable across occupations
that require a similar mix of tasks (Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010), Yamaguchi
(2012), Cortes & Gallipoli (2018)). The present thesis contributes to this literature
by linking wages in different occupations to training received in the same occupa-
tions. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first to provide such estimates.
The transferability of skills is of particular importance in the face of sectoral
shocks. A final related strand of literature documents persistent adjustment costs
for workers resulting from trade shocks (e.g. Autor et al. (2013), Autor et al.
(2014)) or industry regulation (Walker (2013)). In the German context, Yi et al.
(2017) show that the impact of sectoral shocks is related to the ability to reallocate
jobs to a new sector. I contribute to this literature by suggesting a microfoundation
for the large persistent impacts that sectoral shocks have been found to have on
worker outcomes.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the setting
of the German apprenticeship system and discusses the data. Chapter 3 sets up the
augmented Roy model. Chapter 4 discusses the identification strategy. Chapter 5
outlines the estimation using control functions. Chapter 6 presents and discusses the
results. Chapter 7 relates my findings to the task distance between trainings and
occupations. Chapter 8 discusses the welfare and policy implications of my results.
Chapter 9 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Setting and Data
2.1 The German Apprenticeship System
The German apprenticeship system is a dual system where apprentices work in firms
for three to four days a week and go to vocational school for the remaining one to two
days. While the training in firms provides apprentices with the necessary practical
skills, vocational schools teach theoretical skills in a number of different subjects.
The total length of an apprenticeship varies between two and three and a half years
depending on the apprenticeship occupation, but the majority of apprenticeships
last three years.
Dual apprenticeships are the main form of upper- and post-secondary education
in Germany and, in 2010, about 70% of those who obtained this education level had
completed an apprenticeship in the dual system.1 Unlike other education forms, the
dual system is regulated under a federal vocational training law (Berufsbildungsge-
setz ) which implies a large degree of standardisation across states. The system is
often regarded as the key pillar of the German education system, supporting low
youth unemployment rates by facilitating the transition of young workers into the
labour market. While enrolment rates have been declining in recent years, still about
60% of high-school graduates took up an apprenticeship in the dual system in 2011.2
Most non-university occupations are included in the dual system, with a few
exceptions in the medical and care occupations.3 In order to start a dual appren-
1Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Bildungsstand der Bevo¨lkerung. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus
2016. Ausgabe 2018. Upper- and post-secondary education corresponds to ISCED levels 3 and
above. The fraction of workers who obtained this education level was around 85% among young
workers in Germany in 2018 (Source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2019 ).
2Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Berufsbildung auf einen Blick, 2013.
3For example, training as a physiotherapist is provided in specialised schools outside the dual
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ticeship, high-shool graduates need to apply to and be offered an apprenticeship
position with a firm. Once the firm accepts an apprentice, it is in charge of pro-
viding the necessary practical training which is regulated under the legally defined
training regulations (Ausbildungsordnung). The state government is responsible for
providing a place at the local vocational school to any apprentice who has been
accepted by a firm. These schools are run and financed by the state so that the
financial burden of apprenticeships in the dual system is split between the private
and public sectors. The curriculum is determined centrally by each state for each
apprenticeship occupation (Rahmenlehrplan) and consists of general and specialised
subjects which may vary depending on the apprenticeship occupation.
All apprenticeships in the dual system are completed through a final examination
which is organised and monitored by the chambers (Kammern) and consists of a
theoretical and a practical part. After completing their apprenticeship, apprentices
often continue to be employed at the same firm as full-time employess (∼ 60% in
2010).4
2.2 Data
This thesis combines two main datasets: an administrative employment panel cov-
ering 1975-2010, and an aggregate dataset containing the universe of occupation-
specific apprenticeship vacancies posted through local employment agencies between
1978-2010.
2.2.1 Employment Panel
The employement panel dataset consists of a 2% sample of all German social secu-
rity records between 1975-2010 (Stichprobe der Integrierten Arbeitsmarktbiografien)
provided by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). These records are
based on all German workers employed in at least one job during that time period,
with the exception of the self-employed, civil servants and those serving in the mili-
tary. This amounts to about 80% of the workforce. Before 1991, only West Germany
is included in the sample, from 1991 the records cover both West and East Germany.
Workers who are selected in the sample are followed for the entire time period. The
system.
4Source: Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Statista 2018.
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dataset includes demographic information such as gender and date of birth as well
as detailed daily information for each (un)employment spell including the start and
end date, occupation, industry, location and daily wage.5 Wages reported in the
data are capped at a time-varying threshold defined within the statutory pension
scheme. In my setting, this threshold will only affect a small fraction of the data
(see Section 2.5).
Importantly, since apprentices in the dual system work in firms for three to four
days a week, they have to pay social security contributions and their apprenticeship
spells are contained in the employment panel dataset. I therefore observe the occu-
pation registered for an apprentice while completing the apprenticeship and define
this as the worker’s training.
2.2.2 Vacancy Data
I use a second dataset for my analysis which contains the universe of all appren-
ticeship vacancies posted through any local German employment agency between
1978-2010.6 Between 1978-1992, the data only covers West Germany. From 1993,
vacancies are recorded for both West and East Germany. In addition to firm-based
vacancies, the data includes external apprenticeship vacancies which are not posted
by a firm (e.g. by nursing schools), but these make up a small fraction of the data
(∼ 12%).7 Recorded vacancies include those which are filled and those which are
not filled after a year and aggregate information is available by year, training and
location. Yearly data is measured as a flow of vacancies between 1. October and 30.
September.8
Occupation-specific apprenticeship vacancies are a close proxy for occupation-
specific labour demand in the economy and, in 2010, the correlation coefficient be-
tween occupation-specific apprenticeship and non-apprenticeship vacancies posted
through local employment agencies was 0.82. At the same time, a particular ad-
vantage of using data on apprenticeship vacancies as opposed to non-apprenticeship
5During the sampling period, Germany did not have a general minimum wage. Instead, the
majority of firms were bound by minimum wages set through industry-specific tariff contracts which
varied by region and occupation.
6This data combines different datasets provided by the German Federal Employment Agency.
Source: Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen, Ausbildungsstellenmarkt, Bewerber und Berufsausbildungsstellen.
7Figures based on 2010. Source: Arbeitsmark in Zahlen - Bewerber und Berufsausbil-
dungsstellen Deutschland, September 2010.
8For example, the data for 2010 contains all vacancies which are posted between 1. October
2009 and 30. September 2010. In practice, given the high-school graduation date in summer, most
vacancies (∼ 60%) are posted between April and September (Source: Statistik zum Ausbildungsstel-
lenmarkt - Bewerber fu¨r Berufsausbildungsstellen und Berufsausbildungsstellen - Zeitreihe).
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vacancies is that it specifically refers to jobs that can be carried out by those who
went through the apprenticeship training system.9 Moreover, in contrast to most
available data on general job vacancies, the degree of involvement of local employ-
ment agencies for apprenticeship vacancies (Einschaltungsgrad) is high. In 2013,
71% of firms publicised their apprenticeship vacancies through an agency, while the
same figure only amounted to 45% for all non-apprenticeship vacancies.10
2.3 Field-Based Occupational Classification
Occupations in the employment panel and the vacancy dataset are coded based
on the same occupational classification called the Klassifikation der Berufe 1988
(KldB88). This former German occupational classification system was replaced by
the current system (KldB2010 ) in 2010. For the purpose of this thesis, the KldB88
has a key advantage over the newer national system and other internationally used
systems such as the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) or
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) in that it is field-based. The other
systems contain a broad category for Managers and as a result, being promoted
might imply that workers change their occupation in the classification. It would
be impossible to accurately translate the hierarchical occupation categories of these
classifications into a field-based system, and these measurement problems would
be a major concern in the present analysis where the combination of training and
occupation choices is of key interest. In fact, the KldB88 was revised significantly
to form the KldB2010 precisely because, given its field-based structure, it was not
comparable to most other international occupational classifications. Directly using
the former field-based system KldB88 in the present analysis therefore offers a unique
opportunity to study the question of interest.
In order to make the estimation both feasible and tractable, I will use a level
of the KldB88 which classifies occupations into 13 distinct categories, implying 169
distinct cells in the training-occupation matrix. The chosen level of categorisation is
the finest for which the historical vacancy dataset is available for a sufficiently long
9As an example, job vacancies advertised as health care occupations may refer to doctors and
nurses, but only those as nurses would be relevant for a workers who does not hold a medical
degree.
10Source: BIBB-report 3/2014 Betriebe auf der Suche nach Ausbildungsplatzbewerberinnen und
-bewerbern: Instrumente und Strategien, and IAB-Stellenerhebung 2013. The degree of involvement
of local employment agencies may vary over the business cycle and firms are more likely to post
vacancies through the local agency when the supply of apprentices is low. The resulting time-
variation will be picked up by time fixed effects which are included in all regression specifications.
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time period. Restricting the number of categories also ensures that the estimation
will remain computationally feasible. A list of the 13 occupations and trainings to-
gether with their sample shares is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Occupations and Trainings with Sample Shares
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Notes: The figure lists the 13 occupations used, and plots their baseline sample shares by occupation
and training. A detailed list of sub-categories contained in each occupation group is provided in
Appendix A.1.
2.4 Sample Selection
The full Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies contains 1,594,466 individu-
als and 41,390,318 observations. Since individuals can have more than one employ-
ment relationship at a time, some of the spells are overlapping. I define the main
employment spell as the highest wage spell and drop all secondary spells (18.79%)
from the sample. Of the remaining individuals, I only keep those who were enrolled
in exactly one apprenticeship in the dual system and whose apprenticeship period
falls into the sampling period (26.19% of individuals). I thus drop all spells belong-
ing to individuals without any apprenticeship training during the sampling period
(69.2%), individuals who were enrolled in two apprenticeship with distinct training
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occupations (4.02%)11, and individuals enrolled in three or more apprenticeships
(< 1%). In order to ensure that the apprenticeship was completed, I further drop all
individuals who were never classified as having completed their apprenticeship in any
of their employment spells. Finally, I drop individuals whose training occupation or
location is unknown when they start their apprenticeship.
I restrict the remaining spells to full-time spells (86.17%) and exclude all spells
with missing location, occupation or missing (or zero) wage.12 Finally, I only keep
employment spells which started after the end of the apprenticeship training and for
which employers recorded the highest education level as vocational training. This
excludes both lower education levels (apprenticeship is not recorded as completed,
7.41%) and higher education levels (additional university or technical college degree,
5.43%) to ensure that the amount of education as measured by years of schooling
is comparable across the sample. The resulting baseline sample contains 291,098
individuals and 4,012,034 employment spells.
2.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the baseline sample. About 48% of all
individuals work outside their training occupation for at least one spell, and 38%
work in more than one occupation throughout their career. The spell length varies
depending on the reason why a new spell is registered with the Federal Employment
Agency. Most commonly, a new spell is registered as part of the compulsory annual
notification of employment.13
Since apprenticeship spells need to fall within the sampling period for all indi-
viduals, the average worker is only 31 years old. As a result, mean daily wages are
relatively low implying that less than 3% of wages exceed the upper earnings limit
in the statutory pension scheme and are capped in the sample. I provide robustness
checks for my results excluding these capped wages from the sample (see Section
6.5). About 45% of all individuals are female.
To give a sense of the distribution of individuals across training-occupation cells,
11Included in this figure are those individuals with missing occupation entry for part of their
apprenticeship training. Since the missing spells could refer to training in a different occupation, I
exlude these individuals.
12Zero wages are used in the data to indicate interrupted employment spells. This could be due
to illness after wage continuation, maternity leave or sabbaticals.
13Spells can have a shorter length if a worker leaves the employer or a notification is required
e.g. due to an occupation change with the same employer or switch from full-time to part-time
employment.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Min Max P10 P50 P90
Individuals ever off diagonal (%) 47.6
Occupation switchers (%) 37.7
Occ. switches per individual 0.7 0 38 0 0 2
Distinct occ. per individual 1.5 1 10 1 1 2.5
Spell length (days) 255 1 365 31 365 365
Daily wages in 2010 Euros 81 1 186 39 77 130
Age 30.6 17 62 20.5 28.5 42.5
Female (% of individuals) 45.4
Female (% of spells) 37.3
N of observations/spells 4,012,034
N of individuals 291,098
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the baseline sample.
Table 2.2 reports the number of spells in each training-occupation cell for the five
largest trainings as a percentage of all training spells. Table 2.3 reports the same
figures for the five largest occupations as a percentage of all occupation spells.14 Both
tables are restricted to spells with ten years of full-time work experience. It can be
seen that, while the majority of individuals work on the diagonal where the training
is the same as the occupation, the fraction of individuals working off the diagonal
is large. This may seem surprising in the German context where the apprenticeship
system is widely believed to facilitate entry into worklife by providing apprentices
with the necessary skills for a specific occupation. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 also document
considerable variation in the share working on the diagonal across trainings and
occupations. For instance, while only 55.2% of individuals with ten years of work
experience who were trained as craft workers also work in this occupation (see Table
2.2), 84.2% of those working as craft workers with the same level of experience were
also trained in this occupation (see Table 2.3). On the other hand, these same figures
amount to 80.6% and 59.5% for office workers.
14Since only selected categories are reported, the row percentages in Table 2.2 and column
percentages in Table 2.3 do not sum to 100. Equivalent tables containing all 13 occupations are
provided in Appendix A.2.
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Table 2.2: Spells as Percentage of Trainings - Selected Categories
Occupation
Office Craft Sales, financ. Health Constr.
workers workers workers workers workers
T
ra
in
in
g
Office workers 80.6 0.6 12.5 1.6 0.1
Craft workers 4.8 55.2 3.9 2.4 2.5
Sales, financ. w. 26.5 1.6 60.5 2.2 0.3
Health, social w. 12.2 0.7 4.3 79.1 0.2
Construction w. 3.5 5.7 3.1 2.9 60.2
Notes: The table reports the number of spells with a particular training-occupation combination
as a percentage of all spells in the training for the baseline sample. Results are restricted to
individuals with ten years of work experience. Occupations are classified using the 13 category
baseline classification. Only the five most common trainings and occupations are reported. As a
result, row percentages do not sum to 100. A full table containing all 13 occupation categories is
available in Appendix A.2.
Table 2.3: Spells as Percentage of Occupations - Selected Categories
Occupation
Office Craft Sales, financ. Health Constr.
workers workers workers workers workers
T
ra
in
in
g
Office workers 59.5 0.7 14.4 2.8 0.3
Craft workers 5.0 84.2 6.2 5.7 7.6
Sales, financ. w. 18.2 1.7 64.8 3.4 0.6
Health, social w. 5.0 0.4 2.7 76.3 0.3
Construction w. 1.7 4.0 2.3 3.2 85.1
Notes: The table reports the number of spells with a particular training-occupation combination
as a percentage of all spells in the occupation for the baseline sample. Results are restricted to
individuals with ten years of work experience. Occupations are classified using the 13 category
baseline classification. Only the five most common trainings and occupations are reported. As a
result, column percentages do not sum to 100. A full table containing all 13 occupation categories
is available in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.2 looks at the variation in occupation choice over a career by plotting the
fraction of individuals working in an occupation equal to their training occupation
by full-time work experience. While, within the 13 occupation classification system,
around 75% of all workers start their career after the apprenticeship working in their
training occupation, this fraction drops to around 65% after 6 years, and around
55% after 25 years of full-time work experience. To alleviate concerns that this
relationship could be confounded by changes in the task content of occupations
which are not picked up by the classification system, Figure A.1 in Appendix A.3
shows the fraction of individuals working on the diagonal over time for the three
different career stages. It can be seen that, over the thirty year sampling period,
these fractions have remained remarkably stable.
Figure 2.2: Fraction On Diagonal by Work Experience
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Notes: The figure plots the fraction of individuals working in their training occupation by full-time
work experience for the baseline sample. Occupations are classified using the 13 category baseline
classification.
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Chapter 3
Selection Model
I model the selection into training and occupations using a generalised two-stage
Roy (1951) model. The model will provide a behavioural justification for the iden-
tification strategy proposed in Chapter 4, and put sufficient structure on the choice
problem to implement the identification strategy using a control function approach.
It does not, however, impose any assumptions required for identification, all of which
will be discussed in Chapter 4 below.
The threshold-crossing nature of the proposed model will be key to the estimation
approach described in Chapter 5. While I suggest a specific model that includes
this feature, note that alternative threshold-crossing models could have been used.1
Importantly, this implies that, as long as the identification assumptions from Chapter
4 hold, my empirical approach is robust to alternative selection models.
3.1 General Setup
The structure of the sequential choice problem is depicted in Figure 3.1. In t =
t0 (stage 1), individual i selects into a training indexed by j = 1, ..., J . In t =
t0 + 1, ..., t0 + T (stage 2), individual i selects into an occupation indexed by k =
1, ..., K. While stage 1 involves a single selection choice in t = t0, stage 2 involves
T selection choices, one for each period t = t0 + 1, ..., t0 + T . Note that the set of
training and occupation options is identical. To outline the selection into training
and occupations, I start by specifying wages in Section 3.2. Given the sequential
nature of the selection problem, I will then solve the model backward, starting with
occupation choices in Section 3.3 before discussing training choice in Section 3.4.
1An example would be a search model where workers pay a search cost in order to enter a specific
occupation which depends negatively on the number of available vacancies in that occupation.
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Figure 3.1: Model Structure
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Notes: The figure illustrates the structure of the selection model described in Chapter 3.
3.2 Wages
I assume a standard human capital model where wages wijkrt of individual i, trained
in occupation j, working in occupation k in region r at time t are given by
wijkrt = W¯krtHijkrt, (3.1)
ln(wijkrt) = w¯krt + hijkrt. (3.2)
Hijkrt denotes human capital of individual i and W¯krt denotes the skill price per unit
of human capital. Lower case letters w¯krt and hijkrt denote the corresponding log
variables.
The log skill price w¯krt is assumed to take the following form:
w¯krt = δr + δt + f(vackrt), (3.3)
where δr and δt are region and time fixed effects, respectively, and f(vackrt) denotes
a flexible function in log vacancies vackrt posted for occupation k in region r at time
t. While f(vackrt) captures the impact of changes in labour demand on log skill
price, the fixed effects summarise any exogenous effect through labour supply.
Following Griliches (1977), I assume an exponential human capital production
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function:
Hijkrt = e
(δi+τjk+β
′Xit+ιik)e(νijkrt), (3.4)
hijkrt = δi + τjk + β
′Xit + ijkrt, (3.5)
where δi denotes an individual-invariant fixed effect, Xit is a vector of controls,
and ijkrt = ιik + νijkrt is the sum of non-random and random productivity ef-
fects, respectively. The non-random productivity effects ιik may be interpreted as
occupation-specific abilitiy of individual i. The (J × K) fixed effects τjk are the
parameters of interest. These parameters capture the producitivity effect from a
particular combination of training j and occupation k. For ease of interpretation, I
start the empirical analysis by parameterising the effect τjk to capture the average
effect of working on versus off the diagonal, before going on to estimate the effect
of all training-occupation combinations non-parametrically. Combining equations
(3.3) and (3.5), I will estimate the following specifications for log wages:
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + δk + τDj=k + β
′Xit + ijkrt, (i)
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + δk + τ
expDj=k + β
′Xit + ijkrt, (ii)
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + τjDj=k + β
′Xit + ijkrt, (iii)
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + τjk + β
′Xit + ijkrt, (iv)
where Xit may include full-time work experience exp and its square, and occupation-
specific work experience expk and its square, depending on the specification.
2 Model
(i) sets τjk = δk + τDj=k, where Dj=k is a dummy variable equal to one if train-
ing j is the same as occupation k, and parameter τ captures the average effect of
working on versus off the diagonal. Model (ii) explores the heterogeneity in τ , and
estimates separate effects τ exp for each yearly full-time work experience bin.3 Model
(iii) estimates separate effects τj for each training j. Finally, model (iv) estimates
the fixed effects for each training-occupation combination. Note that, since individ-
uals in the sample complete exactly one training, the inclusion of individual fixed
2The inclusion of expk as control makes the choice model dynamic and can lead to an additional
source of endogeneity since past occupation-specific work experience is equivalent to past selection
into occupations. See Appendix E for details on the inclusion of expk and the implications for
estimation in the current context.
3More specifically, τexp denote the parameters on the interaction between yearly experience bins
and the dummy variable Dj=k. I also estimate a model to explore the heterogeneity in parameter
τ by occupation-specific work experience expk. Details on the model and estimation can be found
in Appendix E. The results are presented in Appendix F.1.1
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effects implies that parameters τjk correspond to the within-training returns.
4 In the
following, the parameters of interest from models (i) to (iv) will jointly be referred
to as τ = (τ, τ exp, τj, τjk).
3.3 Occupation Choice
Define the utility when working in occupation k at time t > t0 as an additively
separable function of log wages and tastes tijkrt:
Ui(k|j)rt = ln(wijkrt) + tijkrt, (3.6)
where the subscripts are chosen to emphasise the conditioning on training choice j.
Assume that individual i observes Ui(k|j)rt, including current vacancies vackrt.
Conditional on training choice j in t = t0, individual i chooses occupation k in
t = t0 +1, ..., t0 +T to maximise the current period-t utility. The occupational choice
problem will therefore be static, but this depends on the specification of log wages
outlined in models (i) to (iv) rather than a restriction on individual i’s foresight. For
instance, the inclusion of occupation-specific experience expk in the wage regressions
leads to current choices affecting future utilities, thereby making the occupational
choice problem dynamic from the individual’s perspective. Note that this only affects
the empirical approach in that it adds a potentially endogenous regressor (expk) to
the wage equation. As noted above, fully specifying the selection mechanism is not
key to the empirical approach as long as the identification assumptions from Chapter
4 hold. I therefore focus on the static model in the main body of the thesis, and
present a dynamic version of the occupation choice problem in Appendix E.1.
Assume that tastes tijkrt are a function of observed characteristics Xijkrt, and
define the error component ψijkrt as
ψijkrt = tijkrt − E[tijkrt|Xijkrt]. (3.7)
The utility of choosing occupation k conditional on training j may then be written
as
Ui(k|j)rt = U˜i(k|j)rt + eijkrt, (3.8)
4Estimating within-occupation returns requires identifying the training fixed effects separately
from the individual fixed effects. See Appendix C.2 for details. Results are presented in Appendices
F.1.4 and F.1.5.
29
where U˜i(k|j)rt = E[ln(wijkrt)|Xijkrt] + E[tijkrt|Xijkrt] is the component of utility
observed to the researcher, the sub-utility function, and eijkrt = ijkrt + ψijkrt is the
unobserved utility component. Individual i chooses occupation k in period t if and
only if
(eijkrt − eijk′rt) > (U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt), ∀k′ 6= k. (3.9)
Using equations (3.8) and (3.9), an occupation dummy variable occi(k|j)rt may be
defined as
occi(k|j)rt =
1 iff Ui(k|j)rt ≥ Ui(k′|j)rt, ∀k′,0 otherwise
=
1 iff indiv. i observed in occupation k conditional on training j0 otherwise.
(3.10)
3.4 Training Choice
For ease of exposition, assume that the current-period utility of training choice j in
t = t0 takes the same form as the utility of choosing occupation k = j.
5 Denote this
utility by Uijr0t0 . Define the value function of training choice j in t = t0 and denote
this by Vijr0t0(Ωr0t0), where Ωr0t0 is the information available in region r = r0 at time
t = t0. For any training choice j, Vijr0t0(Ωr0t0) may be written as
Vijr0t0(Ωr0t0) = U˜ijr0t0 + eijr0t0 + βEt0 [Vijr(t0+1)|Ωr0t0 ], (3.11)
where β denotes a discount factor and Et0 [Vijr(t0+1)|Ωr0t0)] is the maximal expected
reward in t = t0 + 1, conditional on training choice j in t = t0. Note that while
current vacancies vackrt are observed to individual i, there is uncertainty about
future vacancies vackrt′ , t
′ > t. Moreover, in t = t0 there is uncertainty regarding
own occupation-specific ability ιik.
6
Individual i maximises expected utility in t = t0 and chooses training j if and
5Choosing training j is therefore contemporaneously equivalent to choosing occupation k = j
in t = t0.
6This may be modelled as additional noise parameter in ψijkr0t0 .
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only if
(eijr0t0 − eij′r0t0) >(U˜ij′r0t0 + βEt0 [Vij′r(t0+1)|Ωr0t0 ])− (U˜ijr0t0 + βEt0 [Vijr(t0+1)|Ωr0t0 ])
= V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ∀j′ 6= j, (3.12)
where V˜ij′r0t0 denotes the conditional value function Vijr0t0(Ωr0t0) − eijr0t0 . Using
equations (3.11) and (3.12), a training dummy variable trainij may be defined as
follows:7
trainij =
1 iff Vijr0t0(Ωr0t0) ≥ Vij′r0t0(Ωr0t0), ∀j′,0 otherwise
=
1 iff individual i observed in training j0 otherwise. (3.13)
Note that, unlike the occupation selection problem, the training selection problem
will be dynamic unless today’s training choice does not affect future wages across
occupations, i.e. unless the parameters of interest τ are equal to zero.
7For ease of exposition, the region and time subscripts have been omitted for the training
dummy as training is only chosen once at the start of a career. This is in contrast to the occupation
dummy which can vary across time as individuals change occupations.
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Chapter 4
Identification
This chapter explains the potential biases resulting from workers’ self-selection into a
training and an occupation, provides intuition for these biases using a hypothetical
experiment and discusses the assumptions required for the proposed instrumental
variable strategy.
4.1 Selection Biases
Wages given in models (i) to (iv) in Section 3.2 will only be observed for a sample
of individuals who selected into training j and occupation k, and the non-random
allocation of individuals to training-occupation cells may lead to sample selection
biases.
Based on the definition of the training and occupation dummies in equations
(3.13) and (3.10), the selection problem may be written as
E[ijkrt|trainij = 1, occij(k|j)rt = 1] 6= 0,
E[ijkrt|Mijkrt = 1] 6= 0, (4.1)
where Mijkrt = trainij × occi(k|j)rt is an indicator taking value one whenever indi-
vidual i is observed in training-occupation cell jk. As a result, naive estimation of
models (i) to (iv) will likely result in biased estimates of the parameters of interest
τ .
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4.2 The Ideal Experiment
Given the two-stage selection in the present context, identifying the effect of a par-
ticular training-occupation combination on wages requires randomising individuals
to a training-occupation cell. The ideal experiment would therefore involve initial
random allocation to a training, followed by random allocation to an occupation.
In order to illustrate why randomisation at the training or the occupation stage
alone will not be sufficient to identify the parameters of interest, consider the follow-
ing example of two hypothetical experiments which look at the two selection biases
into training and into occupations independently. For ease of illustration, focus on
a stylised version of model (i) with only two possible trainings and occupations,
j, k ∈ {1, 2}, and two time periods, t ∈ {0, 1}. The parameter of interest τ > 0
captures the average log wage effect of working on versus off the diagonal. Individ-
uals train in t = 0 and work in t = 1. Denote by trainij and occik the training and
occupation dummies which are equal to one if individual i is trained in j/working
in occupation k. Further denote by i1, i2 the error terms in t = 1 in occupations
1 and 2, and assume that these are jointly normally distributed with mean zero,
standard deviation σ1 = σ2 , and σ12 = 0.
1 For simplicity, assume that the error
terms are known in t = 0. Finally, assume that individuals self-select into a training
and occupation based on a simplified version of the Roy (1951) model above where
the training is chosen in t = 0 to maximise expected log wages, Et=0[ln(wit=1)], and
the occupation is chosen in t = 1 to maximise current log wages ln(wit=1).
4.2.1 Selection into Training
In order to analyse the selection into training, consider a first hypothetical experi-
ment where individuals choose their training j and are subsequently randomly allo-
cated to an occupation k. Assume that individuals do not know that they will be
randomly allocated to occupations when making their training choice in t = 0. Fo-
cusing on occupation k = 1, the resulting selection bias when estimating parameter
1For notational simplicity, other subscripts have been omitted.
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τ may be written as
E[i1|traini1 = 1, occi1 = 1]− E[i1|traini1 = 0, occi1 = 1]
= E[i1|traini1 = 1]− E[i1|traini1 = 0]
= E[i1| (i1 − i2) > 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
chose training 1
]− E[i1| (i1 − i2) < 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
chose training 2
] ≥ 0, (4.2)
where the difference in the observed component of expected log wages has been nor-
malised to zero.2 The final inequality follows from the assumptions made on the
error terms (see Appendix B.1 for a proof of this result). Intuitively, comparing
individuals working in occupation 1 who previously selected into training 1 to indi-
viduals working in occupation 1 who previously selected into training 2 will result in
estimates of τ which are upward biased as those with higher ability in occupation 1
will have chosen it as a training. Under the given assumptions, selection into training
will thus lead to positive bias when estimating parameter τ .3
4.2.2 Selection into Occupations
Now consider a second hypothetical experiment where individuals are randomly
allocated to a training in t = 0, and can subsequently choose their occupation in
t = 1. Again focusing on occupation k = 1, the selection bias when estimating
parameter τ may be written as
E[i1|traini1 = 1, occi1 = 1]− E[i1|traini1 = 0, occi1 = 1]
= E[i1|(occi1 = 1|traini1 = 1)]− E[i1|(occi1 = 1|traini1 = 0)]
= E[i1| (i1 − i2) > −τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
choose occupation 1
cond. on training 1
]− E[i1| (i1 − i2) > τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
choose occupation 1
cond. on training 2
] ≤ 0, (4.3)
where the difference in observed log wages net of τ has been normalised to zero.4 As
before, the final inequality follows from the assumptions made on the error terms (see
Appendix B.1 for a proof of this result). Workers who choose occupation 1 in t = 1
conditional on having been randomly allocated to training 1 in t = 0 are positively
2Alternatively, one could consider on- versus off-diagonal workers in the same training. Under
the given assumptions, the qualitative conclusions would be unchanged.
3Note that, unless specific assumptions are made on the distribution and correlation structure
of the error terms, the sign of the bias is ambiguous, i.e. the selection into training could lead to
positive or negative bias in parameter τ .
4As before, one could consider on- versus off-diagonal workers in the same training. Under the
given assumptions, the qualitative conclusions would be unchanged.
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selected. These workers realise the benefit τ from working on the diagonal where j =
k by choosing occupation 1. On the other hand, workers who have previously been
allocated to training 2 would have realised the benefit of working on the diagonal by
choosing occupation 2. The fact that they nonetheless choose occupation 1 implies
they are more positively selected than their co-workers who received training in
occupation 1. Intuitively, workers working off the diagonal after random allocation
to their training must be very productive in their chosen occupation as their ability
needs to compensate for the lack of training. Under the given assumptions, selection
into occupations will therefore lead to negative bias when estimating parameter τ .5
4.3 Instrumental Variables
The high dimensionality of the selection problem poses a challenge to identification
in the present setting. An instrumental variables strategy needs to randomly allocate
individuals to one of J trainings, and one of K occupations.
To address this challenge, I use the historical occupation-specific apprenticeship
vacancy data described in Section 2.2.2. The general idea behind this approach is
to use changes in occupation-specific labour demand to generate random variation
in training and occupation choices. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, using data on
apprenticeship vacancies as opposed to non-apprenticeship vacancies has the advan-
tage of reducing measurement error and maximising data coverage in the present
context. At the same time, as shown in Section 2.2.2, occupation-specific appren-
ticeship vacancies (henceforth vacancies) are a close proxy for occupation-specific
labour demand more generally.
Recall that r0 and t0 denote the region and time period in which an individual
starts their apprenticeship. While future expected vacancies in occupations other
than the chosen training serve as instruments for the training choice, subsequent
shocks to these vacancies in occupations other than the chosen one serve as instru-
ments for the occupation choice.6 Denote these sets of instruments by IVtrainj and
5Note that, unless specific assumptions are made on the distribution and correlation structure
of the error terms, the sign of the bias is ambiguous, i.e. the selection into occupations could lead
to positive or negative bias in parameter τ .
6See Section 5.4 for details on how I split vacancies into expectations and shocks.
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IVocck , and define them as follows:
IVtrainj = Et0 [vacj′r(t0+τ)|Ωr0t0 ], ∀j′ 6= j, ∀τ = 0, ..., 30, (4.4)
IVocck = (vack′rt − Et0 [vack′rt|Ωr0t0 ]), ∀k′ 6= k, (4.5)
where, as in Chapter 3, Ωr0t0 denotes the information available at the time of training
choice. Under the standard IV assumptions discussed below (see Section 4.4), the
interaction of all instruments will provide sufficient variation to identify the (J ×
K) − 1 parameters in the training-occupation matrix. A behavioural justification
for this identification strategy is given by the two-stage Roy (1951) model presented
in Chapter 3. Intuitively, if individuals consider their comparative advantage when
making their training choice, expected labour demand outside the chosen training j
will affect the choice of training. Similarly, shocks to labour demand other than the
chosen option will affect the choice of occupation.
4.4 Identification Assumptions
The identification assumptions for the training and occupation instruments are sum-
marised in Figure 4.1. All arrows represent direct causal effects of one variable on
another. The bold arrows are the causal parameters of interest. For ease of exposi-
tion, individual, time and region subscripts have been omitted.
4.4.1 Exclusion and Conditional Independence
The exclusion restriction and conditional independence assumption state that the
instruments do not affect the outcome other than through the selection into a partic-
ular jk-cell, and are as good as randomly assigned relative to the outcome variable.
In Figure 4.1, this is visualised by the absence of further arrows that start at the
instruments and point to the outcome variable, or arrows connecting the instruments
with the outcome variable.
A potential threat to the exclusion restriction is given by general equilibrium
feedback effects through supply. Even though vacancies outside the chosen option
do not directly affect wages, they may lead to changes in occupation-specific labour
supply which may affect wages over time. Within a time period, such feedback effects
are unlikely and therefore do not pose a concern for the occupation instruments.
In the long-run, there may be feedback effects from the training instruments as
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Figure 4.1: Identification Assumptions
trainj occk
IVtrainj IVocck
ln(wjk)
vack region, time
IVs:
outcome:
choice:
controls:
Notes: The figure illustrates the identification assumptions described in Chapter 4.
changes in the expected labour demand affect current labour supply. The main
related concern would be trends in relative occupation size over time. To address
this concern, I show that my results are robust to including occupation times time
fixed effects in the baseline model (see Table F.5 in Appendix F.2).
The key assumption underlying random assignment is that, within a given re-
gion and time period, changes in labour demand are caused by random productivity
shocks to an occupation. To rule out strategic vacancy setting motives, each firm
needs to be small relative to the market. This is true empirically where around
three quarters of apprentices are trained in small and medium-sized firms.7 More-
over, random assignment requires that, within region and time period, own vacancies
effectively summarise all information that is relevant for occupation-specific wages.
If this assumption fails, correlated shocks across occupations can be problematic as
they may imply confounding correlations between the instruments and the outcome.8
An obvious concern would be industry-specific shocks that systematically affect va-
cancies across occupations. In a robustness check, I therefore explicitly control for
7Around 50% are trained in small firms with less than 50 employees, a further 23% are trained
in medium-sized firms with more than 50 and less than 250 employees (see Figure A.2 in Appendix
A.4). Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit.
8Similarly, the exclusion restriction rules out any spillover effects from vacancies in occupation
k′ on vacancies in occupation k. Given that information on posted vacancies is not made publicly
available immediately, such spillovers seem unlikely within any given year.
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industry times time fixed effects in the estimation (see Table F.5 in Appendix F.2).
My results are unchanged, giving strong support to the identification assumptions
made.9
Since occupation shocks may display serial correlation, a further potential threat
to conditional random assignment would be any impact of past shocks on current
wages arising from feedback effects through labour supply. Insofar as those are
related to trends in relative occupation sizes, they should be accounted for by the
robustness check discussed above.
Finally, conditional random assignment rules out systematic relocation of indi-
viduals as a result of labour market conditions. For instance, individuals who are
particularly able in a specific occupation could choose to move to a state with a high
number of vacancies in a given year. Empirically, however, mobility is low. On aver-
age, over 93% of apprentices start their apprenticeship in their state of residence.10
Moreover, only about 10− 15% of all occupation changes in the sample correspond
to changes of the region in which the employer is located. Section 6.5 provides a
robustness check excluding these spells from the sample.
4.4.2 Relevance
The relevance or first stage assumption states that the set of instruments needs to
be sufficiently related to the training and occupation choices. In Figure 4.1, this is
visualised by arrows leading from the instruments to the choice variables. In the
context of categorical endogenous variables, first stage F-statistics are not available,
and a natural way of assessing the relevance assumption is to look at the variation in
selection probabilities generated by the instruments (e.g. Hull (2018)) (see Section
5.5 for details on the estimation of the selection probabilitities). Histograms of the
selection probabilities into the five largest trainings and occupations are shown in
Appendix C.1. It can be seen that, for both trainings and occupations, there is
considerable variation in the selection probabilities and, on average, the variation
generated by the instruments is above 25pp. Similar ranges have been found by Hull
(2018), who concludes that there is sufficient first stage variation.
9As a complementary check, I also examine the pairwise correlations of vacancies across all
occupations and do not find a pattern of higher correlations across vacancies for occupations that
belong to arguably similar industries. For example, while the two main occupations belonging to the
manufacturing sector (craft workers and process and plant workers) display a vacancy correlation
of 0.24 across the sampling period, the correlation between vacancies for electrical workers and
sales and financial workers is 0.88.
10Source: Datenreport zum Berufsbildungsbericht 2016. Figure represents the population-
weighted average across states in 2016.
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Chapter 5
Estimation
The implementation of identification strategies in high-dimensional selection models
poses a number of challenges. Given the categorical nature of the selection variable,
simple linear 2SLS estimation is not feasible. Instead, I will adopt a control func-
tion approach to implement the identification strategy proposed in Chapter 4. The
general idea behind control function estimators is to model the endogenous compo-
nent of the regression error term and control for it in the estimation. In the present
context, define λjk(...) as the appropriate control function using equation (4.1):
λjk(...) = E[ijkrt|Mijkrt = 1], (5.1)
where λjk(...) depends on a set of variables further defined below. Note that it is
important to allow the control function to vary across jk-cells.
Standard parametric control function approaches are computationally infeasible
in high-dimensional settings. For instance, a two-step Heckman (1979) estimator
would require the integration of a (J × K)-fold integral over the joint distribution
of the outcome and selection error terms. My approach in the present setting will
be to use both a non-parametric and a parametric control function estimator which
are implemented using assumptions on the joint distribution of the outcome and
selection errors to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. This method builds
on Lee (1983) and Dahl (2002), and extends their insights in settings with high-
dimensional selection to a case with two selection stages.
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5.1 Reduction of Dimensionality
To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, first note that it is possible to write
the selection problem in terms of the vector of utility and value function differences:
trainij = 1 iff (Vi1r0t0 − Vijr0t0 , ..., ViJr0t0 − Vijr0t0) ≤ 0, (5.2)
occi(k|j)rt = 1 iff (Ui(1|j)rt − Ui(k|j)rt, ..., Ui(K|j)rt − Ui(k|j)rt) ≤ 0, (5.3)
where 0 is a (J/K)-dimensional vector. Lee (1983) shows that the selection rules
may be reframed in terms of maximum order statistics:
trainij = 1 iff max
j′
(Vij′r0t0 − Vijr0t0) ≤ 0, (5.4)
occi(k|j)rt = 1 iff max
k′
(Ui(k′|j)rt − Ui(k|j)rt) ≤ 0. (5.5)
Note that rewriting equations (5.2) and (5.3) in this way does not impose any as-
sumptions on the underlying selection rules. Define the joint cumulative distribution
of the outcome and selection error terms as Fjk(...), and the joint cumulative distri-
bution of the outcome error terms and the two maximum order statistics as Gjk(...).
Denote the corresponding probability density functions by fjk(...) and gjk(...). Note
that, in line with the control function defined in equation (5.1), I allow the distri-
butions to vary by jk-cell. Evaluating Fjk(...) at the observed value function and
utility differences and using Lee’s (1983) insight on maximum order statistics, the
following equality holds:
Fjk(z0, V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ..., V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 , U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt)
= Gjk(z0, 0, 0|V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt).
(5.6)
The equivalence of the above distribution functions may also be written in terms of
density functions fjk(...) and gjk(...). Moreover, there exists a one-to-one mapping
between selection probabilities, and utility and value function differences, so that the
joint distribution gjk(...) may be conditioned on the vector of selection probabilities
instead of the observed utility and value function differences (see Appendix D.1 for
details). Based on this result, it has been shown that control functions in single-index
models may be written as a function of the probability of selection only (Heckman
& Robb (1985); Ahn & Powell (1993)). Applying a similar result to the present
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multiple-index framework, model (iv) may be written as
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + τjk
+ λjk(pi1r0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt) + uijkrt, (5.7)
where pijr0t0 is the probability of selecting into training j, pi(k|j)rt is the probability
of selecting into occupation k conditional on training j, and uijkrt is a mean zero
error term.
Note that, given the sequential nature of the selection problem, the control func-
tions λjk(...) depend only on those occupation probabilities pi(k|j)rt that condition on
the observed training choice j. The sequential nature of the selection problem there-
fore reduces the dimensionality of the control function. Nonetheless, estimating this
equation non-parametrically would require a flexible function in (J+K) probabilities
to be included in (J ×K) different control functions which will be infeasible in the
present high-dimensional context. I follow Lee (1983) and Dahl (2002) and impose
a distributional assumption to further reduce the dimensionality of the problem.
Dahl (2002) imposes the following index sufficiency assumption which states that
the distribution gjk(...) depends on the set of selection probabilities only through the
probabilities of selection into the observed jk-cell:
gjk(jkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt)|
pi1r0t0 , ..., pijr0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(k|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt)
= gjk(ijkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt)|
pijr0t0 , pi(k|j)rt). (A1)
Intuitively, assumption (A1) states that all information about the joint distribution
gjk(...) is summarised by the indices pijr0t0 and pi(k|j)rt. This assumption may be
relaxed by assuming that gjk(...) also depends on a (small) set of selection proba-
bilities such as the second or third best alternative. These probabilites are however
not observed.1 In the present sequential context, a natural extension would be to
also include the probability of working on the diagonal, pi(k=j|j)rt. I show that my
results are robust to relaxing assumption (A1) and also allowing gjk(...) to depend
on pi(k=j|j)rt (see Appendix F.2).
Implicit in Lee’s (1983) parametric approach is a stronger assumption which
1In his application on the selection of individuals into US states, Dahl (2002) also includes the
probability of staying in the state of birth in the estimation.
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states that the joint distribution of outcome errors and maximum order statistics
gjk(...) does not depend on the vector of selection probabilities. Dahl (2002) makes
this assumption explicit:
gjk(jkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt)|
pi1r0t0 , ..., pijr0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(k|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt)
does not depend on (pi1r0t0 , ..., pijr0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(k|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt).
(A2)
In the following, I will use assumptions (A1) and (A2) to estimate the parameters
of interest described in Section 3.2. As further discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3,
since jk-specific intercepts are only identified at infinity, their estimation relies on
assumption (A2) and requires a specific distributional assumption on gjk(...). On the
other hand, the estimation of slope parameters may proceed using a non-parametric
approach under the weaker assumption (A1).2
I use model (ii) to explain both estimation approaches as the parameters of in-
terest τ exp contain both intercepts (the experience-invariant components) and slopes
(the change in τ exp over the experience schedule). Since both the non-parametric
and the parametric approach may be used to estimate the slope parameters, compar-
ing the estimated experience slopes under both approaches will allow me to assess
the distributional assumption required for the estimation of the experience-invariant
intercepts (see Sections 5.3 and 6.2).
5.2 Non-parametric Control Function
Under the index sufficiency assumption (A1), model (ii) may be written as
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + δk + τ
expDj=k + λjk(pijr0t0 , pi(k|j)rt) + uijkrt,
(5.8)
where E[uijkrt|Mijkrt = 1] = 0. Dahl (2002) provides a proof of this result which I
adapt to the present context and present in Appendix D.2. Under the instrumental
variable assumptions presented in Section 4.4, the difference in parameters τ exp for
any two experience levels, i.e. the slope of the effect by experience, will be identi-
fied non-parametrically given consistent estimators for the probabilities pijr0t0 and
2Slope parameters are effects of variables that vary conditional on selection choice and selection
probabilities.
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pi(k|j)rt. On the other hand, the estimation of the jk-specific intercepts contained in
τ exp requires a stronger distributional assumption which will be discussed in Section
5.3 below.
In order to implement the non-parametric approach, the control functions λjk(...)
may be approximated using a flexible polynomial in the selection probabilities pijr0t0
and pi(k|j)rt, where parameters on all terms in the polynomial are allowed to vary by
jk-cell. In Section 5.5, I show how I derive the estimates for the selection probabil-
ities, pˆijr0t0 and pˆi(k|j)rt. With these at hand, I approximate λjk(...) with a second-
order polynomial in the estimated probabilities pˆijr0t0 and pˆi(k|j)rt, where parameters
are allowed to vary for a selected number of jk-cells. The selected jk-cells include
all jk-cells where j = k, and an additional cell for each occupation k where j 6= k.
5.3 Parametric Control Function
While Dahl’s (2002) flexible non-parametric approach can be used to estimate the
slope parameters, it is problematic for any jk-specific intercepts since identifying
these separately from the intercepts in the control function relies on strong support
requirements on the instruments.3 In practice, it may be difficult to meet such
strong support requirements. This is especially true in settings with a large number
of choice alternatives.
An alternative to this approach is to make parametric assumptions on the distri-
bution of outcome and selection errors. Intuitively, this method extrapolates the se-
lection probabilities by imposing a functional form assumption in order to separately
identify the parameters of interest from the intercepts of the control function. How-
ever, parameterising the distribution of the error terms in high-dimensional settings
may make estimation infeasible. Lee (1983) addresses this problem by constructing
new random variables from the maximum order statistics that greatly simplify the
estimation. The details of his approach in the present setting are described in Ap-
pendix D.3. His basic idea is that even though the joint distribution of maximum
order statistics may not be identically distributed, it is possible to construct a new
random variable from the maximum order statistics that is identically distributed.
Lee (1983) then assumes that the joint distribution of outcome errors and the newly
3In particular, semi-parametric identification of average treatment effects (ATEs) in Roy mod-
els is often based on “identification at infinity” (IAI) arguments (Chamberlain (1986), Heckman
(1990)). Intuitively, the IAI approach relies on the instruments to have enough support so that for
some values, individuals select into a specific group with probability close to one. At these values
of the instruments, the selection bias goes to zero and OLS consistenly estimates the ATE.
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constructed random variable does not vary with the observed utility or value func-
tion differences. Dahl (2002) shows that this assumption is equivalent to assumption
(A2).
The final step involves making parametric assumptions on the distributions. I
follow Lee (1983) and impose standard normality assumptions for the relevant dis-
tributions. The control function is then given by the well-known function of the
inverse Mill’s ratio (Heckman (1976, 1979)):
λjk(pi1r0t0 , ...piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt) = −ρjk
φ[Φ−1(pijkrt)]
pijkrt
, (5.9)
where pijkrt = pijr0t0×pi(k|j)rt is the probability of selecting into the observed training-
occupation cell jk, ρjk is the correlation between the outcome error and newly con-
structed random variable, and φ(.) and Φ(.) denote the standard normal probability
density and cumulative density function, respectively. Given consistent estimates for
the selection probabilities pijkrt, the parametric approach may be implemented by
evaluating the inverse Mill’s ratio at these estimates and including an interaction of
this expression with selected jk-cells in the outcome equation.4 Log wages in model
(ii) may then be written as
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + δk + τ
expDj=k − ρjkφ[Φ
−1(pijkrt)]
pijkrt
+ uijkrt,
(5.10)
where E[uijkrt|Mijkrt = 1] = 0.
Lee’s (1983) approach makes estimation in high-dimensional selection problems
feasible, but directly applying his transformation in the present setting simplifies
the selection problem by abstracting from its sequential nature. This simplification
implies that the same control function estimator would have been used in a static
context with (J × K) choice alternatives even though the joint distribution of the
outcome and transformed errors would likely have been different. In a seminal con-
tribution, Vytlacil (2002) establishes the equivalence between the standard Local
Average Treatment (LATE) model first proposed by Imbens & Angrist (1994), and
a non-parametric latent threshold crossing model. Based on this result, Kline &
Walters (2019) show that a wide class of control function estimators yield estimates
of the LATE that are identical to non-parametric IV estimates. However, the same
does not necessarily hold for the estimation of ATEs which may be more sensitive
4See Section 5.2 for the selection of jk-cells.
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to the choice of distributional assumptions. To justify the distributional assump-
tions required for the identification of intercept parameters in the present setting, I
use the fact that the slope parameters in model (ii) may be estimated using a non-
parametric control function estimator. The idea is to compare the estimated slope
parameters from the parametric approach described in Section 5.3 to those obtained
using the non-parametric approach from Section 5.2. The more similar the para-
metric estimates are to the non-parametric ones, the more likely the distrubtional
assumptions are to hold in practice. Figure 6.2 in Section 6.2 provides the results
for this comparison. It can be seen that the slope estimates from both approaches
coincide almost exactly, lending support to the distributional assumptions made.
5.4 Splitting Vacancies
In order to obtain the training and occupation instruments defined in equations
(4.4) and (4.5), vacancies need to be split into expectations and shocks. To do
so, I estimate separate linear time trend models in each region-time cell, where log
vacancies for each occupation are explained using five years of previous data:5
ln(vackrt) = κkr + pikrt × t+ εkrt, ∀rt. (5.11)
Note that I allow both the intercepts and slopes to be occupation-specific. Based on
the region and time when first starting the apprenticeship, r0 and t0, 30-year ahead
predictions for vacancies in each occupation are then computed for each individual
as conditional expectations using equation (5.11):
Et0 [ln(vackr(t0+τ))|Ωr0t0 ] = κˆkr0 + pˆikr0t0 × (t0 + τ), ∀τ = 0, ..., 30. (5.12)
For any t = t0+τ , individual-specific shocks to vacancies are then defined as residuals
relative to the expectation formed at the time of training choice t0 in region r0:
vackrt − Et0 [ln(vackr(t0+τ))|Ωr0t0 ], ∀τ = 0, ..., 30. (5.13)
5Note that using five years of past data to predict future vacancies implies that predictions
and shocks will not be available during the first five years of the sample, 1978-1981. Moreover, due
to regional classification changes following German reunification, data on predictions and shocks
will also not be available for four regions between 1994-1997. This will reduce the number of
observations in the baseline sample used in the estimation.
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While the conditional expectations derived using equation (5.12) will serve as train-
ing instruments IVtrainj , the residuals from equation (5.13) will serve as occupation
instruments IVocck . Note that, using this definition, expectations and shocks will be
orthogonal by construction.
5.5 Estimating the Selection Probabilities
Implementing the control function approach requires consistent estimators for the
selection probabilities pijr0t0 and pi(k|j)rt. Using the definition of the instrumental
variables in equations (4.4) and (4.5), the selection probabilities may be written as
pijr0t0 = Pr(trainij = 1|V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ..., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0)
= Pr(trainij = 1|IVtrainj , Et0 [vacjr(t0+τ)|Ωr0t0 ], Xijkrt), ∀τ = 0, ..., 30,
(5.14)
pi(k|j)rt = Pr(occi(k|j)rt = 1|U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt)
= Pr(occi(k|j)rt = 1|trainij = 1, IVtrainj , IVocck , vackrt, Xijkrt), (5.15)
where Xijkrt is a set of controls including gender and full-time work experience.
Writing the probabilites in this way makes clear that, as shown in Figure 4.1, the
training choice will only depend on the first set of instruments and the occupation
choice will depend on both sets of instruments as well as the previous training choice.
The most common approach to estimating choice probabilities in high-dimensional
settings is the conditional logit model (McFadden (1974)). While this method pro-
vides convenient closed-form expressions for the choice probabilities, it requires spe-
cific functional form assumptions. This can be particularly problematic in the pres-
ence of a large number of independent variables. In the present context, there are
over 400 independent variables to predict both training and occupation choices. Pa-
rameterising choices using a sufficiently flexible functional form in these variables
would quickly make the estimation infeasible.
I therefore employ an alternative approach and estimate selection probabilities
non-parametrically using a machine learning algorithm, random forests. This algo-
rithm uses the large set of explanatory variables described in equations (5.14) and
(5.15) to predict the choice variables trainij and occi(k|j)rt by using optimal split-
ting rules on the explanatory variables. Details on the random forest algorithm as
well as the implementation of the algorithm in the present context can be found
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in Appendix D.4. With the estimated probabilities at hand, the control function
estimation proceeds by replacing the selection probabilties from Sections 5.2 and 5.3
with their estimates pˆijr0t0 and pˆi(k|j)rt.
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Chapter 6
Results
This chapter discusses the results for models (i) to (iv) from Section 3.2. In all
baseline estimations, f(vackrt) will be approximated using a fourth order polynomial
in vackrt. Robustness using a tenth order polynomial is provided in Section 6.5.
6.1 Average Return to Working On versus Off the
Diagonal
This section reports and discusses the results for model (i), where parameter τ
captures the average return to working on versus off the diagonal. Table 6.1 shows
the regression results. The main variable of interest is the dummy Dj=k which is
equal to one if the individual works on the diagonal. Columns (1) and (2) report the
results from estimations that do not control for occupation-specific experience, expk,
columns (3) and (4) add expk and its square as control variables. Both specifications
are first estimated without controlling for selection (columns (1) and (3)), then using
the control function estimator (columns (2) and (4)).1
The results from column (1) show that working on the diagonal is associated with
a small negative wage effect. This effect becomes more negative after controlling for
expk (column (3)), a result which is in line with workers on the diagonal having
more occupation-specific experience. When accounting for selection using the para-
metric control function estimator, the effect of Dj=k becomes positive and significant
(columns (2) and (4)), implying that not contolling for selection into training and oc-
1Note that, since occupation-specific experience corresponds to past selection into occupations,
an additional instrument is required and the control function estimator needs to be adapted for the
results in column (4) (see Appendix E.2 and E.3 for details). Empirically, also instrumenting for
expk as in Table 6.1 column (4) gives a very similar result compared to treating expk as exogenous.
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cupations leads to a sizeable negative selection bias of around 10 percentage points.
The coefficients on the parametric control function are highly significant in all regres-
sions, confirming the importance of the selection bias. Intuitively, workers working
on the diagonal may be negatively selected relative to workers off the diagonal as the
latter must compensate for the lack of training with increased occupation-specific
ability (see Section 4.2).
Table 6.1: Average On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dj=k = 1 −0.0076 0.1226∗∗∗ −0.0281∗∗∗ 0.1006∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0311) (0.0070) (0.0278)
exp 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0437∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0046)
exp2 −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
expk 0.0176
∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0049)
exp2k −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Indiv. FE yes yes yes yes
Occ./Reg./Time FE yes yes yes yes
Parametric cf no yes no yes
p-value cf 0.000 0.000
N 1,143,782 1,143,782 1,146,854 1,146,854
Notes: The table reports regression results for model (i). Results are based on the baseline sample,
further excluding years where the instruments are not available (see Section 5.4), and restricting the
sample to spells which started after the end of an apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly
selected as test sample (see Appendix D.4). Observations are weighted using the empirical training-
occupation distribution in 2010. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region and
time level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Results from column (2) suggest that working on the diagonal leads to a signif-
icant wage increase of about 12%. This figure may be interpreted as the full effect
of having received training in the current occupation, including potentially higher
experience in that occupation which was accumulated as a result of the training.2
As before, controlling for occupation-specific experience lowers the effect of Dj=k to
2Alternatively, one can think of the causal effect of “going back in time” and re-choosing the
training.
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about 10% (column (4)). Albeit smaller than the full effect of 12%, the results from
column (4) suggest that most of the positive effect of working on the diagonal is
due to the training itself, not the subsequent effect that training may have on the
accumulation of occupation-specific experience.
In the heterogeneity and full-matrix analysis that follows, the full-effect specifica-
tion corresponding to columns (1) and (2) will be used as the default, i.e. regressions
will control for total work experience exp but not for occupation-specific work experi-
ence expk. Appendix F.1.1 explicitly considers heterogeneity by occupation-specific
work experience.
6.2 Heterogeneity by Experience
This section reports and discusses the results for model (ii), which looks at the het-
erogeneity in on- versus off-diagonal returns across different levels of full-time work
experience. Figure 6.1 plots separate coefficient estimates for τ exp, where experience
levels have been binned into yearly categories. Each coefficient compares workers
with a specific level of full-time work experience who were trained in the occupation
they are working in to workers with the same level of experience who were not trained
in the occupation they are working in. Similar to columns (1) and (2) from Table
6.1, the effect shown therefore represents the full effect of having received training,
including any occupation-specific work experience accumulated in the current oc-
cupation as a result of having received the training. Results by occupation-specific
experience are presented in Appendix F.1.1.
Figure 6.1 plots coefficient estimates from an estimation without selection con-
trol, and using the parametric control function estimator. In line with the results
from Table 6.1, it can be seen that not controlling for selection leads to a sizeable
negative bias in the coefficient estimates. The set of coefficients estimated using the
parametric control function suggests that the effect of Dj=k first increases slightly
from around 11% to 12.5%, then falls to just under 10% after 12 years of work ex-
perience where it stabilises. While the increase over the first few years is in line
with an initially stronger accumulation of occupation-specific work experience for
on-diagonal workers, the subsequent decline suggests that off-diagonal workers are
able to partly catch up with their co-workers who received the relevant training.
However, there is no full catch-up and sizeable differences remain after 20 years of
work experience.
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Figure 6.2 plots the same set of coefficients estimated with the parametric control
function estimator as Figure 6.1, adding the coefficients estimated without selection
control, and those estimated using the non-parametric control function estimator.
Since the non-parametric control function approach identifies the slope but not the
level of the parameters of interest (see Sections 5.3 and 5.2), all coefficients are
normalised to zero at zero years of work experience. Comparing the set of coefficients
estimated without selection and with the parametric control function estimator, it
can be seen that not controlling for selection leads to an increasingly negative bias
in the estimated coefficients, such that final levels are underestimated by about 2%
more than those at low levels of work experience. This increase in bias is in line
with workers receiving better information about their occupation-specific abilities
over time.
Moreover, comparing the set of coefficients estimated with the parametric and
the non-parametric control function estimator shows that the slope estimated using
the non-parametric selection control is almost identical to that of the parametric
selection control. This lends support to the distributional assumptions made to im-
plement the parametric approach (see Section 5.3). As a robustness check, Appendix
F.2 reports a similar comparison, adding on-diagonal probability terms to the non-
parametric control function (see Section 5.1). The results provide further support
to the distributional assumptions made.
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Figure 6.1: On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns by Experience
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Notes: The figure plots regression coefficient estimates for τexp in model (ii), where experience levels
have been binned into yearly categories. Results are based on the baseline sample, further excluding
years where the instruments are not available (see Section 5.4), and restricting the sample to spells
which started after the end of an apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test
sample (see Appendix D.4). Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation
distribution in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the region and time level. 95% confidence
intervals are shown.
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Figure 6.2: Normalised On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns by Experience
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Notes: The figure plots regression coefficient estimates for τexp in model (ii), where experience
levels have been binned into yearly categories. All coefficient estimates are normalised to zero at
zero years of work experience. Results are based on the baseline sample, further excluding years
where the instruments are not available (see Section 5.4), and restricting the sample to spells
which started after the end of an apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test
sample (see Appendix D.4). Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation
distribution in 2010.
6.3 Heterogeneity by Training
This section presents and discusses the results for model (iii) which explores the
heterogeneity in on- versus off-diagonal returns across trainings. Figure 6.3 plots the
coefficients τj estimated with and without the parametric control function estimator.
There appears to be an inverse relationship between both sets of coefficients which
will be further discussed below. The coefficient estimates are highly heterogeneous
and, out of the five largest trainings, health and social workers have the highest
and craft workers the lowest return to working in their training occupation. Note
that model (iii) does not contain occupation fixed effects. As a result, negative
coefficient estimates τˆj may be explained by other occupations k 6= j providing
better opportunities, regardless of the training.
Since workers choose their occupations taking into account the return to working
on versus off the diagonal, the heterogeneity in these returns across trainings should
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Figure 6.3: Average On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns by Training
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Notes: The figure shows regression coefficient estimates for τj in model (iii) for each training.
Results are based on the baseline sample, further excluding years where the instruments are not
available (see Section 5.4), and restricting the sample to spells which started after the end of an
apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test sample (see Appendix D.4).
Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation distribution in 2010. Standard
errors are clustered at the region and time level. 95% confidence intervals shown.
affect the fraction of individuals choosing to work on the diagonal ex-post. Condi-
tional on training choice, the Roy model predicts that more workers will select onto
the diagonal, the higher the on- versus off-diagonal return in that training. Figure
6.4 explores this relationship by plotting the average return to working on the diag-
onal (from Figure 6.3) and the fraction working on the diagonal for each training.
The positive slope is consistent with the Roy model predictions outlined above.3
3Note that the model is also consistent with alternative explanations for the positive correla-
tion in Figure 6.4 which are based on the ex-ante selection into training rather than the ex-post
occupation choice conditional on training. For instance, conditional on the expected average re-
turns to a training, higher returns to working on the diagonal may lead to lower expected value
of that training if individuals are risk averse. As a result, workers choosing that training may be
more positively selected. This will in turn lead to fewer individuals with that training choosing to
work off the diagonal ex-post. Note that, in contrast to the direct effect of the returns on ex-post
occupation choice outlined in the main body of the thesis, alternative explanations based on the
selection into training rely more heavily on the exact specification of preferences in the model.
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Figure 6.4: Average Return and Fraction Working in Training Occupation
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Notes: The figure plots average on- versus off-diagonal returns for each training from Figure 6.3
against the fraction of individuals working in their training occupation. The fitted line corresponds
to a weighted OLS regression using the sample fraction in each training as weights. Marker size is
proportional to the weights.
A further implication of the Roy model is that heterogeneity in the average return
to working on versus off the diagonal across trainings affects the size of the selection
bias. As outlined in Section 6.1, the strong negative bias in average returns suggests
that on-diagonal workers are negatively selected relative to off -diagonal workers, as
the latter need to compensate for their lack of training through higher occupation-
specific ability. As a result, one may expect a negative correlation between the
on-diagonal return and the estimated selection bias across trainings. The higher the
return to working on the diagonal for a particular training, the more occupation-
specific ability outside the training is required to work off the diagonal, so returns
in high-return trainings will be more strongly underestimated when not controlling
for selection.4 Figure F.2 in Appendix F.1.2 confirms this by showing a negative
4Note that selection into training may instead lead to a positive correlation between the on-
diagonal return and the estimated selection bias across trainings. Conditional on expected average
returns across trainings, higher on-diagonal returns may lead to lower expected value of that
training if individuals are risk averse. As a result, workers choosing that training are more positively
selected, i.e. they have higher ability in their training relative to other trainings. This may lead to
returns being more highly overestimated.
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correlation between the estimated return and the selection bias across trainings.
6.4 Full Training-Occupation Matrix
This section reports and discusses the results for model (iv) which contains separate
parameters τjk for all cells in the training-occupation matrix. Table 6.2 reports
the coefficient estimates τˆjk using the parametric control function estimator. For
expositional clarity, results are shown for the five largest occupations only. The full
tables of coefficients, estimated with and without selection control, can be found in
Appendix F.1.3. As outlined above, the inclusion of individual fixed effects in the
estimation implies that all coefficients should be interpreted relative to the diagonal
within the same training. Coefficients relative to the diagonal in the same occupation
are presented in Appendix F.1.5.
In line with the positive on- versus off-diagonal returns for four out of five of the
largest trainings (see Figure 6.3), Table 6.2 shows that, with the exception of train-
ing as a craft worker, most coefficients are significant and negative suggesting that
individuals incur wage penalties when working outside their training occupation.
Nonetheless, there is considerable heterogeneity in the magnitudes of off-diagonal
returns across trainings. For instance, the results suggest that while trained office
workers incur moderate penalties when working in a different occupation, much
larger penalties are incurred by trained health and social workers who work in other
occupations, with estimates ranging between −0.93 and −0.43 log points.5 Table
6.2 also shows that returns are highly asymmetric. While trained office workers in-
cur sizeable penalities when working as craft workers, trained craft workers receive
wage gains when working as office workers. In line with this finding, the fact that
all trainings incur penalties when working as craft workers suggests that craft oc-
cupations provide generally worse opportunities (see Section 6.3). Similar to Figure
6.4, Figure F.3 in Appendix F.1.3 plots the estimated off-diagonal returns against
the fraction of individuals choosing to work in the relevant occupation conditional
on their training. Albeit noisier than Figure 6.4, the positive correlation in the full
training-occupation matrix confirms the importance of returns in determining the
selection into occupations.
While hard to interpret individually, the estimates from the full training-occupa-
tion matrix provide an opportunity to study the mechanisms underlying the results
5Note this is in line with the higher on- versus off-diagonal return estimated for health and
social workers in Section 6.3.
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presented in this thesis. In Chapter 7, I use data on the task content of trainings
and occupations to explore both the heterogeneity and asymmetry in estimated re-
turns, thereby providing a microfoundation for the estimates presented in this study.
Table 6.2: Full Matrix of Returns - Within Training
Occupation
Office Craft Sales, financ. Health Constr.
workers workers workers workers workers
T
ra
in
in
g
Office workers 0 −0.37∗ 0.01 −0.30∗∗ 0.13
(0.19) (0.08) (0.13) (0.25)
Craft workers 0.20∗∗ 0 0.39∗∗∗ 0.05 0.43∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.15)
Sales, financ. w. −0.04 −0.10 0 −0.13 0.36∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15)
Health, social w. −0.77∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗ 0 −0.43∗
(0.10) (0.16) (0.09) (0.23)
Construction w. −0.15 −0.24∗∗ 0.08 −0.27∗ 0
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13)
Notes: The table shows regression coefficient estimates for τjk in model (iv), estimated using the
parametric control function estimator. Results are based on the baseline sample, further excluding
years where the instruments are not available (see Section 5.4), and restricting the sample to spells
which started after the end of an apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test
sample (see Appendix D.4). Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation
distribution in 2010. Results are shown for the five largest occupations. The full matrix of coeffi-
cients is presented in Appendix F.1.3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region
and time level. Given the low number of clusters, critical values of the t(9)-distribution are used.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
6.5 Robustness
Table 6.3 provides robustness checks for the main result in column (2) of Table 6.1 by
restricting the sample in a number of different ways.6 Column (1) excludes employ-
ment spells where workers change the region in which their employer is located (see
Section 4.4.1); column (2) restricts the sample to individuals with an apprenticeship
length between two and a half and three years; column (3) excludes wages that could
potentially have been capped in the dataset (see Section 2.5); column (4) excludes
individuals who switched firms during their apprenticeship; column (5) excludes all
6Further robustness results focusing on the estimation method can be found in Appendix F.2.
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spells where workers were employed in their apprenticeship firm. As in column (2)
Table 6.1, results are obtained using the parametric control function estimator.
Table 6.3 shows that the effect of working on versus off the diagonal is signifi-
cantly positive in all columns, with most results being quantitatively very similar to
the main sample estimate of 12.3%. Columns (1), (2) and (3) all report coefficient
estimates of around 12%. While column (1) alleviates potential concerns regarding
the conditional random assignment assumption (see Section 4.4.1), columns (2) and
(3) suggest that differences in the length across apprenticeships or the presense of in-
stitutional wage caps in the data are not driving the main result. The point estimate
is slightly higher at 14.4% in column (4), and slightly lower at 7.2% in column (5).
While the result in column (5) is partly driven by the fact that the main coefficient
is lower at higher levels of experience (see Figure 6.1 Section 6.2), and that spells in
apprenticeship firms are concentrated early in a worker’s career, these results also
point to potential complementarities of working both in the occupation and the firm
one has been trained for. However, column (5) shows that the coefficient remains
sizeable even when controlling for such complementarities by excluding spells in the
firm workers got trained in.
58
Table 6.3: Average On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns - Sample Restr. Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
no movers app. length no capped no app.-firm- no spells in
2.5− 3 years wages switchers app. firm
Dj=k = 1 0.1216
∗∗∗ 0.1147∗∗ 0.1213∗∗∗ 0.1436∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0383) (0.0297) (0.0326) (0.0266)
exp 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0026)
exp2 −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Indiv. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Occ. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Reg. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Param. cf yes yes yes yes yes
p-value cf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1,121,091 281,571 1,121,626 1,027,817 827,396
Notes: The table reports regression results for model (i). Each column restricts the baseline
sample as indicated in the column header, further excluding years where the instruments are not
available (see Section 5.4), and restricting the sample to spells which started after the end of an
apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test sample (see Appendix D.4).
Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation distribution in 2010. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region and time level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 7
Task Content
This chapter provides a microfoundation for the results presented in this thesis by
drawing on the literature on the task content of occupations. The task approach
considers tasks as inputs to production. While these tasks are defined as units of
work activity, skills refer to the human capital required to carry out the tasks (Autor
(2013)). Occupations, as discrete classification units, can thus be viewed as vectors
of tasks to be carried out by workers.1
Measures of task content have been used to analyse shifts in the wage structure
both between occupations (e.g. Autor et al. (2003), Goos et al. (2014)) and
within occupations (e.g. Van der Velde (2017)). More recently, the concept of
occupations as task vectors has been used to construct measures of distance between
occupations. Poletaev & Robinson (2008) and Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010) argue
that, if human capital is task-specific, it should be more easily transferable across
occupations that require a similar mix of tasks. Using samples of displaced workers,
they find that wage penalties are larger the more distant the occupational switch
after displacement. Yamaguchi (2012) sets up a structural model to formalise these
findings. Similarly, Cortes & Gallipoli (2018) estimate a structural model and show
that task difference is a significant component of the cost of switching occupations.
When applied to the present context, these findings suggest a potential explana-
tion for the heterogeneity in estimated returns in the training-occupation matrix. If
workers are trained in a specific mix of tasks during their apprenticeship (equal to
the mix of tasks performed in the occupation they are trained for), then one might
expect the penalty when working in a different occupation to be larger, the more
1More generally, task vectors could be carried out by labour or capital and changes in relative
prices may lead to changes in the allocation of tasks to labour or capital (Acemoglu & Autor (2010),
Autor (2013)). I abstract from such changes and focus on the task vectors which are carried out
by workers within each occupation.
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distant in terms of the task content the occupation is from the original training.
More recent studies in the task content literature also offer an explanation for the
substantial asymmetries in returns found across the training-occupation matrix (see
Section 6.4). This work defines the direction of an occupational move as the change
in the overall level of required skills (equivalently the task intensity), and argues
that the direction may play an important role in how transferable human capital is.
When taking into account the direction of an occupational move, the transferability
of human capital from occupation 1 to occupation 2 may not be the same as the
transferability from occupation 2 to occupation 1. Nedelkoska et al. (2015) find
that switching costs after displacement are larger for workers who move to less skill-
demanding occupations. Robinson (2018) uses information on the intensity with
which tasks are performed, and finds that the negative wage effect that symmetric
task distance has for displaced workers can only be detected when workers move
to jobs that require lower overall skill levels. In the present context, these findings
suggest that the change in the overall required skill level between a training and an
occupation may matter and, more interestingly, there may be important interactions
between the symmetric distance and direction of the training-occupation pair for
individuals working off the diagonal.
Section 7.1 describes the task content data that I use to construct measures of
task distance, direction and specificity in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 describes a simple
statistical model where returns to a training-occupation match are a function of the
skills that workers with a given training have when working in a given occupation.
Section 7.4 presents and discusses the results.
7.1 Data
The measure of task distance is constructed using data from the German Qualifica-
tion and Career Survey (GQS), a representative telephone survey of around 20.000
individuals conducted by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training and
Education (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung - BiBB). This data has been used to
study the skill requirements across occupations in Germany in a variety of differ-
ent contexts (e.g. DiNardo & Pischke (1997), Spitz-Oener (2006) and Gathmann
& Scho¨nberg (2010)). For the present analysis, I use three survey waves that fall
within the time period used for the estimation of returns in the training-occupation
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matrix (1985/86, 1991/92, 1998/99).2
The survey records information about workers’ occupations and asks them to
pick from a list of tasks the ones they perform in their current occupation. I fol-
low Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010) and combine all survey waves to create a list of
19 tasks. A summary table of the tasks together with the percentage of individu-
als working in the two largest occupations (office workers and craft workers) who
indicated that they perform these tasks is presented in Figure 7.1 below.3
An advantage of the GQS task data is that, unlike the Dictionary of Occupational
Title (DOT) which is the primary source of task data in the US, it makes a clear
distinction between tasks and skills.4 As a result, the task measures in the GQS all
refer to activities that are required in specific occupations (e.g. operate machines) as
opposed to capabilities of workers which are required to carry these out (e.g. manual
dexterity).
While recording detailed information on the type of tasks performed across dif-
ferent occupations, an important drawback of the GQS task data is that it does
not provide information on the level or intensity at which the tasks are performed.
However, the change in the overall level of required skills when moving occupations
has been found to matter for the transferability of human capital. To proxy for such
changes in skill intensity, I use the estimated on-diagonal returns across different
trainings from Appendix F.1.4. Together with the task content data, this allows me
to obtain measures of both the distance and the direction of a training-occupation
match defined below (see Section 7.2).
2All three surveys were conducted in collaboration with the German Institute for Employment
Research (IAB). Survey wave 2006 was carried out jointly with the German Federal Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin - BAuA)
and is not used since, unlike the other three waves, occupations were coded using an updated
classification system.
3To construct averages, sample observations within each wave are weighted using provided
survey weights and subsequently combined giving equal weight to each survey wave.
4See Yamaguchi (2012) and Robinson (2018) for a recent discussion of the job measures in the
DOT.
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Table 7.1: List of Tasks and Fraction Performing
Task Office workers Craft workers
Cultivate 0% 1%
Serve or accommodate 2% 0%
Clean 2% 4%
Manufacture, install or construct 3% 41%
Secure 3% 3%
Publish, present or entertain others 5% 0%
Repair, renovate, reconstruct 6% 68%
Equip or operate machines 11% 61%
Nurse or treat others 16% 9%
Pack, ship or transport 17% 20%
Execute laws or interpret rules 25% 3%
Design, plan, sketch 28% 19%
Research, evaluate or measure 32% 35%
Program 33% 2%
Teach or train others 36% 25%
Employ, manage personnel, organise, coordinate 38% 14%
Calculate or do bookkeeping 41% 6%
Sell, buy or advertise 43% 17%
Correct texts or data 74% 9%
Notes: The table shows the average fraction of individuals indicating they perform the given task.
Fractions are based on survey waves 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99.
7.2 Measure Definitions
7.2.1 Task Distance
Define a task vector for each occupation k, qk = (q1k, ..., qSk), where qsk is the fraction
of workers performing task s in occupation k. Similarly, define a task vector for each
training j, qj = (q1j, ..., qSj), where qsj is the fraction of workers performing task s
when being trained in training j. Assume that the composition of tasks when being
trained in j is equivalent to the composition of tasks performed when working in
occupation k = j.
Following Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010), I define the angular separation be-
tween training j and occupation k as a measure of similarity using task vectors qj
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and qk:
AngSimjk =
∑S
s=1(qsj × qsk)
[(
∑S
s=1 q
2
sj)× (
∑S
s=1 q
2
sk)]
1/2
. (7.1)
Note that, using this definition, the similarity measure will be symmetric, meaning
that training 1 and occupation 2 have the same similarity as training 2 and occupa-
tion 1. Moreover, the similarity is not affected by differences in the overall level of
required skills across occupations.5
Measuring similarity between two vectors by the angular separation has first been
proposed by Jaffe (1986, 1989a) in the context of estimating R&D spillovers across
technologically similar firms.6 The angular separation is equivalent to the uncentered
correlation or the cosine difference between two vectors and is a symmetric, purely
directional measure, i.e. it is unaffected by the length of two skill vectors qj and qk.
7
AngSimjk ranges between zero and one, with two orthogonal task vectors having
similarity zero, and is increasing in the degree of overlap between two task vectors
qj and qk. Following Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010), I define (1−AngSimjk) as the
distance between training j and occupation k:
Distjk = (1− AngSimjk). (7.2)
Excluding on-diagonal training-occupation cells where Distjk = 0, the distance mea-
sure varies between 0.01 and 0.59 with a mean of 0.34. When weighting off-diagonal
cells by their sample fractions, the mean distance drops to 0.28 suggesting that,
on average, workers who leave their training occupation work in occupations which
are more similar to their training than the average occupation. Figure 7.1 confirms
this by showing a negative correlation between training-occupation distance and the
fraction of workers in the relevant occupation. Tables G.1 and G.2 in Appendix G.1
report the distance measure for the five most similar and five most distant training-
occupation pairs, as well as for the five largest trainings and occupations.
5See e.g. Poletaev & Robinson (2008) for a symmetric distance measure that incorporates
information on the level of required skills.
6Subsequently, a number of other studies have used the measure in a variety of different con-
texts such as spillovers of university research to commercial innovation (Jaffe (1989b)), knowledge-
relatedness in technological diversification (Breschi et al. (2003)) and similarity of tasks performed
across occupations (Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010), Cortes & Gallipoli (2018)).
7In contrast to that, the Euclidean distance between two vectors qj and qk measures the length
of the vector connecting qj and qk and is therefore sensitive to the length of qj and qk. As a result,
two occupations with relatively short vector lengths could be classified as similiar even when they
are orthogonal.
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Figure 7.1: Distance and Sample Fraction
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Notes: The figure plots training-occupation distances against the within-training sample fraction
of workers in the relevant occupation for each off-diagonal training-occupation pair. The fitted line
corresponds to a weighted OLS regression where each training-occupation pair is weighted by the
fraction of total workers in that cell. Marker size is proportional to the weights.
7.2.2 Direction
Robinson (2018) defines the direction of an occupational move as the difference in
the overall task intensity between the new and the old occupation.8
As outlined in Section 7.1, the GQS does not contain measures of task intensities
across occupations. To proxy for the direction of a match between training j and
occupation k, I therefore use the returns on the diagonal across trainings estimated
in Appendix F.1.4. These returns are unaffected by the distance of the match (by
definition, on-diagonal matches have Distjk = 0) and can be viewed as proxies for
the overall level of skill required for workers in the respective occupations.
8More specifically, Robinson (2018) uses the sum of the difference of individual components of
a task vector, where each component measures the intensity of a particular task. This captures
overall differences in the vector length in his context since most occupational changes involve all
task intensities changing in the same direction.
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Following this line of reasoning, I define the direction of a match between training
j and occupation k as
Dirjk = (δk − δj), (7.3)
where δs is the on-diagonal return in training/occupation s estimated in Appendix
F.1.4.
Following Robinson (2018), I also create a dummy variable characterising a move
from j to k as follows:
Downjk =
1 iff Dirjk < 00 otherwise. (7.4)
In the following, a training-occupation match characterised by Downjk = 1 will
often be termed a downward move. Similary, define Upjk = (1 − Downjk). A
training-occupation match characterised by Upjk = 1 will equivalently be termed as
an upward move.
7.2.3 Training Specificity
Define the specificity of training j as the weighted average distance Distjk to all
off-diagonal occupations k 6= j:
Specj =
∑
k 6=j
wjk ×Distjk, (7.5)
where wjk is the fraction of off-diagonal workers with training j working in occupation
k. Intuitively, Specj measures the (lack of) task overlap between training j and all
other occupations, where lower task overlap corresponds to higher specificity. The
specificity measure varies between 0.21 and 0.45, with a mean of 0.30 and a sample
weighted mean of 0.27. As shown in Figure 7.2, a larger fraction of workers in the
sample is trained in less specific trainings. Table G.3 in Appendix G.1 reports the
specificity for each training j.
Since the direction of a training-occupation match will be important for the
ensuing analysis, I also define the upward and downward specificity relative to oc-
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Figure 7.2: Training Specificity and Sample Share
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Notes: The figure plots training specificity against the sample share trained for each training. The
fitted line corresponds to a weighted OLS regression where each training is weighted by the fraction
of total workers with that training. Marker size is proportional to the weights.
cupations that require a lower/higher skill level for each training:
Specj|Up =
∑
k 6=j
(wjk ×Distjk × Upjk), (7.6)
Specj|Down =
∑
k 6=j
(wjk ×Distjk ×Downjk), (7.7)
where the dummy variables Upjk and Downjk are defined as in Section 7.2.2. Tables
G.4 and G.5 in Appendix G.1 report the upward and downward specificity for each
training j.
Note that, in contrast to equation (7.5), the weights in equations (7.6) and (7.7)
do not sum to one. By definition, the overall specificity of a training j is equal to
the sum of upward and downward specificity:
Specj = Specj|Up + Specj|Down. (7.8)
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7.3 A Simple Model of Match Returns and Tasks
I model the returns to matches between a training and an occupation combining
five elements from the task approach literature. (1) Tasks are inputs to production
and therefore occupation attributes. (2) Skills refer to the human capital that is
required to carry out tasks and are therefore worker attributes. (3) Wage penalties
after displacement tend to be larger the more distant the new occupation is from the
previous one. (4) Wage penalties after displacement tend to be larger the lower the
overall skill level required in the new occupation. (5) Occupational distance has a
higher impact on wages after displacement when the new occupation requires lower
overall levels of skill. While the first two elements are conceptual issues emphasising
the importance of a clear distinction between tasks and skills (Autor (2013), Autor &
Handel (2013)), elements three, four and five relate to empirical findings that have
emerged in the task content literature (see e.g. Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010),
Nedelkoska et al. (2015), Robinson (2018))
7.3.1 Within-Training Returns and Task Distance
I combine elements (1) to (5) to model the returns τjk from model (iv) in Section
3.2 as functions of skills that workers with training j have at performing tasks in
occupation k (elements (1) and (2)). These skills are in turn a function of the task
distance between j and k (element (3)) and the direction of the move between j and
k (elements (4) and (5)). Returns τjk may therefore be written as
τjk = f [skilljk] + ηjk
= f [g(Distjk, Dirjk)] + ηjk, (7.9)
where skilljk are the skills workers with training j have at performing tasks in
occupation k, Distjk and Dirjk are the distance and direction between j and k as
defined in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, and ηjk is a match-specific error term. Note
that, as outlined above, even though the distance measure Distjk is symmetric, the
inclusion of Dirjk allows for asymmetries in the training-occupation matrix such that
the returns to working in occupation 1 with training 2 may differ from the returns
to working in occupation 2 with training 1.
I follow Robinson (2018) and assume a linear specification for the off-diagonal
returns τjk in which the distance affects wage returns differentially depending on
whether the direction of the move is positive or negative. After replacing off-diagonal
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returns τjk with their estimates τˆjk from Section 6.4, this implies the following re-
gression equation:
τˆjk = αj + γ1Distjk + γ2(Distjk ×Downjk) + β′Xjk + ηjk, (7.10)
where Xjk is a vector of controls including the dummy variable Downjk, Dirjk and
its square Dir2jk. These controls allow for a direct impact of the direction of the
match between j and k on returns.9
Assuming that skills are more easily transferable, the closer the tasks in occu-
pation k are to those acquired in training j, one would expect a negative coefficient
on Distjk when estimating a regression with symmetric distance effects (excluding
the term (Downjk × Distjk) in equation (7.10)). Moreover, Robinson (2018) finds
that, when the effect of distance is allowed to vary by the direction of the move, its
negative overall effect is primarily driven by downward moves. This would imply a
negative coefficient γ2.
7.3.2 Across-Training Returns and Training Specificity
This section illustrates the implications of the model presented in equation (7.10)
for the average on- versus off-diagonal returns across training, τj, from model (iii) in
Section 3.2. Recall that the returns τjk in the full training-occupation matrix measure
the return to working in occupation k with training j relative to the diagonal cell
within the same training. As a result, the relationship between average on- versus
off-diagonal returns in training j, τj, and full matrix returns τjk is given by
τj = −
∑
k 6=j
wjk × τjk, (7.11)
where, as in Section 7.2.3, wjk is the fraction of off-diagonal workers with training j
working in occupation k. Using model (7.10), and replacing the average on- versus
off-diagonal returns τj with their estimates τˆj from Section 6.3, the latter may be
9Note that, since returns τˆjk are relative to the diagonal in the same training, the model
contains training-specific fixed effects.
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written as
τˆj = −[
∑
k 6=j
wjk(αj + γ1Distjk + γ2(Distjk ×Downjk) + β′Xjk + ηjk)]
= −[α + γ1
∑
k 6=j
wjk(Distjk × Upjk))
+ (γ1 + γ2)
∑
k 6=j
wjk(Distjk ×Downjk) + β′Xj] + ξj, (7.12)
where Xj is a vector of controls including the fraction of off-diagonal moves to occu-
pations requiring a lower skill level than training j, the weighted average direction
Dirjk and the weighted average of the squared direction Dir
2
jk. ξj is a training-
specific error term that includes training-specific intercepts. Using the definitions of
specificity from Section 7.2.3, τˆj may be written as
τˆj = −[α + γ1Specj|Up + (γ1 + γ2)Specj|Down + β′Xj] + ξj
= −[α + γ1Specj + γ2Specj|Down + β′Xj] + ξj. (7.13)
Equation (7.13) shows how the model of off-diagonal returns from equation (7.10)
may be used to link training specificity to the on- versus off-diagonal returns across
trainings.
7.4 Results
This section provides results on the relationship between returns and task distance
based on the simple model presented in Section 7.3. To this end, I estimate equation
(7.10) using the within-training estimated on- versus off-diagonal returns τˆjk from
Section 6.4 as dependent variable. I then use the model from equation (7.13) to
provide insights into the across-training variation in on- versus off-diagonal returns
τˆj from Section 6.3.
7.4.1 Returns and Task Distance
Table 7.2 reports the regression results for equation (7.10), where on-diagonal (τˆjk =
0) coefficients have been excluded.10 Column (1) shows that, on average, the ef-
fect of task distance on returns is negative and significant suggesting that the more
10Appendix F.2 provides a robustness result including these observations.
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different the combination of tasks in the current occupation is from that of the orig-
inal training, the lower the return relative to working in one’s training occupation.
Distjk has been standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to
one. The results therefore suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in task
distance is associated with a reduction in the return to the match of about 4pp.,
or about 50% of the average τˆjk. This finding is consistent with the negative effect
that occupational distance has been found to have on wages after displacement (e.g.
Gathmann & Scho¨nberg (2010)).
Columns (2) and (4) add the controls described in Section 7.3.2 to the regression.
The effect of Distjk becomes slightly more negative as a result. As expected, the
coefficients on Downjk and Dirjk are negative, suggesting that moving to an occu-
pation requiring a lower overall level of skill reduces the return relative to working
in one’s training occupation.
After allowing for differential effects of distance (columns (3) and (5)) the effect
of Distjk when moving upward becomes small and insignificant, while the effect of
Distjk when moving downward increases in magnitude suggesting a strong asymme-
try in the effect of distance on returns. This result is in line with recent findings by
Robinson (2018). The results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in dis-
tance does not significantly affect returns when the overall level of required skills in
occupation k is higher than in training j, but significantly reduces returns by about
12pp. (13pp. relative to an upward move) when the level is lower. This suggests that,
in addition to the direct penalties associated with moving to occupations that require
lower overall levels of skill, the effect of distance is exacerbated by the downward
move. While difficult to motivate theoretically, this empirical heterogeneity in the
effect of distance can help explain the important asymmetries in estimated returns
in the training-occupation matrix.
When estimating the same specifications as in Table 7.2 with left-hand side re-
turns estimated without selection control, the effect of Distjk is smaller in magnitude
and only marginally significant (see Appendix G.2, Table G.6). The above findings
are robust to including the on-diagonal observations where Distjk = 0 and τˆjk are
zero (see Appendix G.3, Tables G.7 and G.8), and restricting the sample to the five
largest trainings and occupations (see Appendix G.3, Tables G.9 and G.10).
Overall, the findings are in line with the proposed hypothesis that apprentices are
trained in a specific mix of tasks and their skill at performing tasks in their current
occupation is lower, the less applicable the acquired skills are to the current occu-
pation. Moreover, the results show that this mechanism primarily works through
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training-occupation matches where the skill level required in the occupation is lower
than the skill level required in the original training. This suggest that, in addition
to the negative direct wage effects, there are higher penalties to task distance when
moving to a lower level occupation.
Table 7.2: Match Returns and Task Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distjk −0.0394∗∗ −0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0216 −0.0477∗∗∗ 0.0133
(0.0149) (0.0106) (0.0278) (0.0126) (0.0297)
Distjk ×Downjk −0.1275∗∗ −0.1311∗∗
(0.0503) (0.0496)
Downjk −0.1140∗∗ −0.1053∗∗ −0.0190 −0.0251
(0.0456) (0.0462) (0.0653) (0.0601)
Dirjk −0.0467∗ −0.0356
(0.0244) (0.0237)
Dir2jk 0.0564
∗∗∗ 0.0587∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0075)
Mean of τˆjk −0.0786 −0.0786 −0.0786 −0.0786 −0.0786
Train. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.6078 0.6151 0.6246 0.6739 0.6844
N 156 156 156 156 156
Notes: The table reports regression results from equation (7.10). Distjk is constructed using survey
waves 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99, and scaled by its standard deviation. Diagonal coefficients
(where τˆjk = 0 and Distjk = 0) have not been included in the regression. Standard errors are
clustered at the training level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
7.4.2 Returns and Training Specificity
This section uses the model from Section 7.3.2 to analyse the across-training variation
in on- versus off-diagonal returns. Since task distance appears to be an important
driver of match returns in the training-occupation matrix within training (see Table
7.2 in Section 7.4.1), a natural conjecture is that specificity as the average distance to
all other occupations drives an important part of the on-versus off-diagonal returns
across trainings. Moreover, in addition to overall specificity, an important role could
be played by the specificity relative to occupations which require a lower overall
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level of skills than the original training. In fact, the results from Table 7.2 in Section
7.4.1 show that, within training, the effect of task distance is much stronger for
downward moves. The aim of this section is to assess whether the same is true for
across-training variation in on- versus off-diagonal returns. Given the small sample
size, results will be shown using partial residual plots.
To this end, I estimate model (7.13) and compute the adjusted specificity returns
τ˜Specjk as sum of the regression residuals and estimated effect of specificity τ˜
Spec
jk =
ξˆj + γˆ1Specj. Similarly, I compute the adjusted downward specificity returns as
τ˜
Spec|Down
jk = ξˆj + γˆ2Specj|Down. Figure 7.3 then plots training specificity Specj
against adjusted returns τ˜Specjk , and training downward specificity Specj|Down against
adjusted returns τ˜
Spec|Down
jk . The resulting two-way correlations in Figure 7.3 can be
shown to correspond to the coefficient estimates γˆ1 and γˆ2.
11
In using model (7.13) to plot these partial correlations, Figure 7.3 may be inter-
preted as the across-training equivalent of the regression results presented in column
(5) in Table 7.2. It can be seen that, while there is only a weak positive partial corre-
lation between on- versus off-diagonal returns and training specificity, the correlation
between returns and training downward specificity is much stronger and positive. In
line with the within-training effect of task distance on training-occupation returns
from Table 7.2, this suggests that while more specific trainings tend to have higher
average on- versus off-diagonal returns, it is primarily the specificity relative to oc-
cupations requiring lower overall levels of skill that drives this result.
11Note that this representation method is chosen for expositional purposes of the relative im-
portance of specificity Specj and downward specificity Specj|Down, and while it gives an accurate
representation of the regression coefficient estimates γˆ1 and γˆ2 from equation (7.13), it may not
provide an accurate reflection of the standard errors associated with the coefficient estimates (see
e.g. Velleman & Welsch (1981))
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Figure 7.3: Training (Downward) Specificity and Adjusted Return
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Notes: The figure plots training specificity Specj and training downward specificity Specj|Down
against adjusted on- versus off-diagonal returns across trainings τ˜Specjk and τ˜
Spec|Down
jk (see Section
7.4.2 for details). The fitted lines correspond to weighted OLS regressions where each training is
weighted by the fraction of total workers with that training. Marker size is proportional to the
weights.
74
Chapter 8
Welfare and Policy
The results from Section 6.1 suggest large average positive returns to working on
versus off the diagonal. This chapter explores the welfare losses from ex-post sub-
optimal training choices which are implied by these estimates. In line with the
proposed model, the key underlying friction is the ex-ante imperfect information at
the time of training choice. As a result, new information about the labour mar-
ket and individual occupation-specific abilities may be revealed over time, causing
workers to seek work in an occupation different from the one they got trained for.
In addition to these off-diagonal workers, I argue that a second group of workers is
affected by the friction. These are workers who are locked into their training despite
having higher occupation-specific ability in a different occupation, since those skills
are not sufficient to compensate for the lack of training.
Section 8.1 quantifies the welfare loss associated with the friction for both off-
diagonal and locked-in workers. Section 8.2 considers a specific potential policy in-
tervention, retraining programmes.1 Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
such programmes could be very effective in addressing the friction in the present
context.
8.1 Welfare Losses
This section looks at the welfare losses associated with the informational frictions
at the time of training choice. All calculations are based on the simple model of
1Importantly, retraining programmes target ex-post wage outcomes and do not require any
assumptions on preferences beyond those given in Chapter 3. Policies targeting welfare conditional
on wage outcomes such as insurance against a “lost training investment” would necessitate strong
assumptions on the distribution of preferences and beliefs at the time of training choice.
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homogenous on- versus off-diagonal returns, model (i). For both off-diagonal and
locked-in workers, I compute losses as the product of the loss per worker and the
share of affected workers.
Focusing first on off-diagonal workers, it is possible to show based on a revealed
preference argument that the loss from the friction is equal to the on-diagonal benefit
τ .2 My findings suggest that τ is 10% (see column (4) in Table 6.1 in Section 6.1).3
Figure 2.2 in Section 2.5 shows that the average share of off-diagonal workers is
about 40%. The welfare loss from off-diagonal workers is therefore given by 4% of
wages for an average worker in the apprenticeship system.
Consider now the workers who are locked into their training. These are defined
as individuals who are working on the diagonal, but who would choose a different
occupation in the absence of any on- versus off-diagonal return. Again using a re-
vealed preference argument, the welfare loss per locked-in worker is bounded from
above by the on- versus off-diagonal return τ . The intuition behind this is that
locked-in workers do not choose to move given the on- versus off-diagonal return.4
Since occupation-specific abilities are unobserved, locked-in workers are not directly
observed in the data. To estimate the share of these workers, I use changes in the
fraction of on-diagonal workers over a career. Table 8.1 summarises the calculations.
Figure 6.1 in Section 6.2 shows that the return to working on versus off the diag-
onal falls by about 2.5pp between 3 − 12 years of work experience.5 At the same
time, the fraction of on-diagonal workers falls from about 70% to 60% (see Figure
2.2 in Section 2.5).6 Assume that other factors causing a decline in the fraction
of on-diagonal workers are stable throughout a career, and consider the change in
the fraction of workers on the diagonal once returns have stabilised, i.e. after 12
2An underlying assumption is that non-monetary within occupation does not depend on the
training received. Note also that this estimate will likely be a lower bound on the gains from
retraining since retraining in the current occupation may not be the first best outcome when
taking into account (1) differences in δj , or (2) heterogeneous returns across the training-occupation
matrix (model (iv)). Moreover, given the distribution of off-diagonal workers across occupations,
the average change in estimated on-diagonal returns across trainings, δj , resulting from retraining
workers in their current occupation is small and positive. This implies that the welfare gains
estimated in this section would be even larger.
3Note that the result controlling for occupation-specific experience should be used here as a
hypothetical retraining scenario would not lead to higher accumulated work experience in the newly
chosen occupation.
4An underlying assumption is that non-monetary utility within occupation is independent of
the training received.
5The same is true for returns by occupation-specific work experience (see Appendix F.1.1).
6This change may in part be induced by a reduction in the lock-in effect caused by the fall
in returns to working on versus off the diagonal. However, other factors such as newly revealed
information about own occupation-specific abilities may have contributed to the decline.
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years of work experience. Figure 2.2 shows that between 12 − 21 years of work ex-
perience, this fraction dropped by about 5pp. This implies that about half of the
drop between 3− 12 years of work experience may be associated with the fall in the
returns to working on versus off the diagonal. These simple calculations therefore
suggest that a 1pp reduction in the return to working on the diagonal leads to a 2pp
drop in the fraction of individuals working on the diagonal.7 In a hypothetical world
without a 10% return on the diagonal, a world without lock-in effects, the fraction
of individuals working on the diagonal would thus be 20pp lower. Combining the
estimated share of 20% with the upper bound on losses per locked-in worker, these
results suggest that the welfare loss from locked-in workers is given by at most 2%
of wages for an average worker in the apprenticeship system.
Table 8.1: Estimating the Share of Locked-in Workers
work exp. ∆ return ∆ fraction implied ∆ fraction ∆ fraction on diag.
(years) on diag. on diag. if ∆ return = 0 ∆ return on diag.
3− 12 −2.5pp −10pp } −5pp
−5pp
−2.5pp = 2
12− 21 0 −5pp − −
Notes: The table summarises the estimation of the share of locked-in workers (see text for details).
Combining the results for off-diagonal and locked-in workers, the total welfare
loss is given by:
Ltotal = Loff−diagonal + Llocked−in
= (lossoff−diagonal × shareoff−diagonal) + (losslocked−in × sharelocked−in)
≤ (τ × shareoff−diagonal) + (τ × sharelocked−in),
Ltotal ≈ 4− 6%. (8.1)
7Note that this is likely going to be an upper bound on the lock-in effect since information on
occupation-specific abilities is expected to be revealed at a higher rate early on in a career.
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8.2 Retraining Programmes
The calculations in Section 8.1 show that the welfare losses from the informational
frictions at the time of training choice are large. This section considers retraining
programmes as a potential policy intervention to recover these losses.8 In light of the
results from Chapter 7, such programmes may be viewed as moving workers’ skills at
performing certain tasks closer to those required in their current occupation. Since
workers are trained in special subjects relating to their training occupation for two
thirds of their training, I assume that retraining programmes would last two thirds
of the original training time.
Retraining programmes will be costly to both the government and training firms.
In addition, workers will face private costs in the form of foregone earnings while
retraining. In 2010, total costs to train an apprentice, including training and school-
ing costs as well as foregone earnings amounted to 29,460 Euros.9 As outlined in
Section 8.1, the per worker yearly welfare gain from retraining is τ .10 My empirical
results suggest that this implies net benefits including foregone work experience of
around 1, 800 Euros per year in 2010.11
Note that, while the costs need to be paid at the time of retraining, the benefits
will subsequently accrue for every year spent working after retraining. Whether or
not retraining has a net benefit therefore depends on the career stage of a worker.
Using a discount factor of 0.99, retraining costs would be recovered for workers with
at most six years of work experience. Since the majority of off-diagonal workers leave
their training occupation in the first few years after completing the apprenticeship
(see Figure 2.2 in Section 2.5) and only switch occupations once (see Table 2.1 in
Section 2.5), these findings suggest that retraining could pass a cost-benefit test for
35% of all workers, or over three quarters of workers ever working off the diagonal.
Moreover, 18% of all workers are still locked in after six years (over 90% of workers
ever locked in). These workers would equally benefit from retraining.12
Given the above figures, an imminent question is why, in practice, few individuals
choose to retrain.13 In theory, firms are not allowed to discriminate against older
8The effects of a potential ex-ante provision of information by the government at the time of
training choice are harder to quantify. See Appendix H.2 for a discussion.
9See Appendix H.1 for details on the calculations.
10This is equivalent to the per worker yearly welfare loss due to the friction.
11See Appendix H.1 for details on the calculations.
12See Appendix H.1 for details on the calculations.
13The sample fraction of individuals enrolled in two apprenticeships in distinct occupations is
4.02% (see Section 2.5). This is likely an overestimate of the fraction retraining as it includes spells
for which the occupation is missing and non-completed apprenticeships.
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applicants and trained workers could apply for training in a different occupation.
Moreover, a number of firms offer special training programmes for career-switchers.14
Anecdotal evidence from internet forums and newspaper articles suggests that the
barriers to retraining fall into two broad categories: liquidity constraints and other
(perceived) costs such as the “fear of starting over again”.15 In light of this evidence,
facilitating entry into retraining programmes by providing easily accessible loans, or
reducing the (perceived) barriers of entry would lead to substantial welfare gains.
14See e.g. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/beruf-chance/ue-40-ausbildung-neubeginn-in-der-
lebensmitte-11968937.html for a newspaper article on this phenomenon.
15The former may be particularly important given retraining becomes relevant when many
workers start a family. Regarding the latter, workers repeatedly state that they fear starting over
again, being isolated amongst their peers due to their age or struggling to keep up with the study
load. Moreover, firms offering programmes for carrer-switchers often ask applicants to pass a set
of tests confirming their motivation and ability to retrain in a different field.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis combines a large employment panel dataset with data on historical
occupation-specific vacancies to identify and estimate the returns to different training-
occupation combinations. To this end, I extend previous work on control function
approaches in the presence of high-dimensional selection to the given context where
individuals select amongst a large number of alternatives in two stages. I provide
a behavioural justification for the identification strategy, and implement the esti-
mation approach by setting up a generalised two-stage Roy (1951) model where
individuals seek relative advantage when choosing their training and occupation. To
the best of my knowledge, this work is the first to present results on the returns to
different training-occupation combinations which are well identified.
The results suggest significant returns of about 10 − 12% to working in the
occupation one has been trained for, with considerable heterogeneity across trainings
and occupations. The estimated selection bias is sizeable and negative, suggesting
that occupation-specific ability needs to compensate for the lack of training in the
chosen occupation.
I find considerable heterogeneity in returns across the full training-occupation
matrix. Combining these returns with data on the task content of occupations
shows that returns in a particular training-occupation cell are lower, the higher the
task distance between the training and the occupation in that cell. These findings
provide an explanation for the heterogeneity in estimated returns, and contribute to
the literature on the task content of occupations by directly relating tasks workers
are trained in to the value of human capital across occupations.
Given the magnitude of the estimates, my findings suggest that the imperfect
information available at the time of training choice leads to important welfare losses
of around 4 − 6% of wages for the average worker. These losses are economically
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meaningful and may seem surprising in the German apprenticeship system which
has been repeatedly termed a role model for other economies in Europe, the US,
China and India.1 My findings show that there are frictions within this system that
should be addressed by policy makers, and I discuss a specific policy instrument,
ex-post retraining programmes. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that such
programmes are likely to generate sizeable net welfare gains. Througout my policy
analysis, I took the existing training system as given, and looked at improvements
in the allocation of workers to training choices. Future work could consider optimal
training programmes by building on my estimates of the effects of task distance on
the returns to training-occupation combinations.
1See e.g. https://www.ft.com/content/1a82e8e0-04cf-11e7-aa5b-6bb07f5c8e12 and
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16159943.
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Appendix A. Descriptives
A.1 List of Occupations
Table A.1: List of Occupations
KldB88 Code Occupation label Sub-label % in code
75-78 Office workers Office workers 73.1
Other 26.9
19-30, 32 Craft workers Vehicle mechanics 14.4
Machine fitters 10.7
Plumbers 10.7
Other 64.2
68-70 Sales, financial Salespeople 34.3
workers Banking experts 24.3
Wholesalers, retail dealers 16.6
Other 24.8
79-89 Health, social Medical receptionists 25.9
workers Nurses, midwives 23.0
Nursery, childcare w. 10.2
Other 40.9
44-51 Construction Bricklayers, concrete w. 21.9
workers Carpenters 21.2
Decorators, painters 15.7
Other 41.2
10-18, 52-54 Process, plant Chemical, plastics proc. w. 26.4
workers Unskilled labourers 19.2
Other 54.4
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Table A.1 continued: List of Occupations
KldB88 Code Occupation label Sub-label % in code
71-74 Transport, storage Vehicle drivers 39.7
workers Movers, warehousers 22.0
Stock clerks 17.9
Other 20.4
60-63 Technical, laboratory Other technicians 22.6
workers Technical drawers 17.0
Electrical technicians 16.0
Other 44.4
31 Electrical workers Electricians 69.5
Telephone technicians 17.2
Electrical appliance fitters 13.3
Other 0
79-89 Personal service Hairdresssers, body care occ. 40.8
workers Hospitality workers 28.4
Other 30.8
39-43 Food preparation Cooks, ready meal producers 39.0
workers Bakers, confectioners 28.6
Butchers, fish processing w. 21.7
Coopers, brewers, food prod. 10.8
Other 0
01-09 Agricultural Gardeners, florists, foresters 57.9
workers Miners, oil production w. 22.9
Farmers, zookeepers 19.2
Other 0
33-37 Textile, garment Tailors, textile ind. w. 59.6
workers Spinners, leather good/shoem. 40.4
Other 0
Notes: The table lists all occupations contained in the baseline sample by fraction in the sample.
Sub-labels are provided for all within-code shares greater than 10%.
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A.2 Distribution of Spells
Table A.2: Spells as Percentage of Trainings
Occupation
01-09 10-18, 52-54 19-30, 32 31 33-37 39-43 44-51 60-63 68-70 71-74 75-78 79-89 90-93
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
01-09 51.9 6.4 4.9 0.8 0.2 0.4 4.8 3.3 5.3 9.6 6.5 4.6 1.4
10-18, 52-54 0.7 57.4 4.2 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.5 12.0 4.7 5.7 8.6 3.6 0.6
19-30, 32 0.9 9.5 55.2 1.6 0.2 0.4 2.5 8.9 3.9 9.2 4.8 2.4 0.6
31 0.6 5.3 8.7 47.0 0.1 0.2 1.2 17.1 3.8 4.7 8.0 2.8 0.5
33-37 0.5 9.6 8.0 0.5 35.5 1.5 3.6 7.1 8.3 5.6 12.7 4.8 2.5
39-43 1.1 8.6 6.2 0.7 0.3 43.2 3.6 1.7 7.8 13.2 6.7 3.6 3.4
44-51 1.1 7.6 5.7 0.5 0.3 0.4 60.2 4.3 3.1 9.4 3.5 2.9 0.9
60-63 0.3 2.7 2.5 3.2 0.0 0.1 0.7 68.6 4.1 1.6 12.8 2.8 0.5
68-70 0.2 2.3 1.6 0.2 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.8 60.5 3.4 26.5 2.1 1.1
71-74 0.1 5.3 3.5 0.9 0.0 0.3 2.5 2.1 7.6 55.4 18.8 2.8 0.7
75-78 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 12.5 2.0 80.6 1.6 0.4
79-89 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 4.3 1.0 12.2 79.1 0.7
90-93 0.4 5.2 3.6 0.5 0.3 3.0 0.6 1.0 10.6 3.8 20.8 4.9 45.2
Notes: The table reports the number of spells with a particular training-occupation combination as a percentage of all spells in the training occupation
for the baseline sample. Results are restricted to individuals with ten years of work experience.
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Table A.3: Spells as Percentage of Occupations
Occupation
01-09 10-18, 52-54 19-30, 32 31 33-37 39-43 44-51 60-63 68-70 71-74 75-78 79-89 90-93
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
01-09 70.7 2.6 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.4 1.5 1.2 0.9 3.9 0.7 1.2 1.5
10-18, 52-54 0.8 19.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 3.8 0.7 1.9 0.8 0.8 0.6
19-30, 32 11.4 36.8 84.2 8.9 8.8 3.6 7.6 32.3 6.2 36.3 5.0 5.7 6.7
31 2.6 6.4 4.1 84.2 0.9 0.7 1.2 19.3 1.9 5.7 2.6 2.1 1.6
33-37 0.2 1.5 0.5 0.1 70.0 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.1
39-43 2.6 6.1 1.7 0.8 2.8 82.8 2.0 1.1 2.3 9.6 1.3 1.6 6.6
44-51 7.0 13.6 4.0 1.2 6.3 2.1 85.1 7.2 2.3 17.1 1.7 3.2 4.3
60-63 0.4 1.2 0.4 2.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 27.6 0.7 0.7 1.5 0.7 0.6
68-70 1.8 5.9 1.7 0.9 6.2 4.4 0.6 1.9 64.8 9.1 18.2 3.4 8.0
71-74 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 5.9 0.5 0.2 0.2
75-78 1.0 2.3 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.3 2.8 14.4 5.5 59.5 2.8 3.1
79-89 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.3 1.1 2.7 1.5 5.0 76.3 2.7
90-93 0.8 2.7 0.7 0.4 2.2 4.1 0.2 0.5 2.2 2.0 2.8 1.6 62.9
Notes: The table reports the number of spells with a particular training-occupation combination as a percentage of all spells in the occupation for
the baseline sample. Results are restricted to individuals with ten years of work experience.
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A.3 Fraction On Diagonal Over Time
Figure A.1: Fraction On Diagonal over Time
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Notes: The figure plots the fraction of individuals working in an occupation equal to their train-
ing occupation over time for the baseline sample. Each line plots this fraction for individuals
who finished their apprenticeship either 5, 10, or 15 years prior to the date shown on the x-axis.
Occupations are classified using the 13 category baseline classification.
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A.4 Training Firm Statistics
Figure A.2: Fraction of Apprentices by Firm Size
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Notes: The figure plots the fraction of apprentices trained in firms with less than 50 (small firms),
100 and 250 (medium-sized firms) employees over time. Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit.
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Appendix B. Proof
B.1 Proof for Section 4.2
E[i1|(i1 − i2) > 0]− E[i1|(i1 − i2) < 0] > 0.
Given i1 ∼ N(0, σ1), i2 ∼ N(0, σ2) with σ1 = σ2 ,
E[i1|(i1 − i2) = ν > z] = σ1σ2
σν
(
σ1
σ2
− ρ12)(
φ(z)
1− Φ(z))
=
σ1σ2
σν
(1− ρ12)(
φ(z)
1− Φ(z)) ≥ 0,
where ρ12 =
σ12
σ1σ2
≤ 1.
It follows that E[i1|(i1 − i2)) > 0]− E[i1|(i1 − i2) < 0] > 0.
Now defining ( φ(z)
1−Φ(z)) = κ(z), κ
′(z) > 0 from the assumption of normality. It follows
that E[i1|(i1 − i2) > −τ ]− E[i1|(i1 − i2) > τ ] ≤ 0.
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Appendix C. Identification
C.1 First Stage
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Figure C.1: First Stage Variation in Selection Probabilities - Training
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Notes: The figure shows a set of histograms of the selection probabilities for the five largest trainings. Histograms in blue show the full variability in
estimated selection probabilities. To give a sense of the variation used in final log wage regressions, histograms in red restrict the sample to males in
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the largest state in Germany.
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Figure C.2: First Stage Variation in Selection Probabilities - Occupation
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Notes: The figure shows a set of histograms of the selection probabilities for the five largest occupations. Histograms in blue show the full variability
in estimated selection probabilities. To give a sense of the variation used in final log wage regressions, histograms in red restrict the sample to males
in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the largest state in Germany, with ten years of work experience who were trained in the respective occupation.
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C.2 Training Fixed Effects
As outlined in Section 3.2, workers in the sample completed exactly one apprentice-
ship and the inclusion of individual fixed effects therefore absorbs any training fixed
effects. As a result, one coefficient in each training row (chosen to be the diagonal)
is not identified, and the coefficients τjk in model (iv) from Section 3.2 correspond
to returns relative to the diagonal within the same training. They may only be
interpreted relative to the diagonal in the same occupation if there are no differences
in the on-diagonal returns across trainings, i.e. the training fixed effects are zero.
While the duration of apprenticeships is relatively homogenous in the German con-
text, there may be systematic quality differences across trainings which could lead
to sizeable differences in these training fixed effects (e.g. Soskice (1994)).
The aim of this section is to separately identify the on-diagonal returns across dif-
ferent trainings from permanent individual heterogeneity. The challenge for such an
exercise is the systematic self-selection of individuals into different trainings. While
the control function estimator should account for these selection effects, and models
(i) to (iv) could have therefore been estimated without individual fixed effects, the
approach taken in this thesis is a more conservative one where the estimated individ-
ual fixed effects δˆi are used to distinguish between training effects δj, and permanent
individual heterogeneity αi ex-post.
Assume that the individual fixed effects δi in models (i) to (iv) are additively
separable in an individual permant component αi, and a training effect δj which
captures the quality across different trainings j:
δi = δj + αi. (C.2.1)
If individuals self-select into trainings, a simple regression of δˆi on a set of training
dummies will not identify the training effects δj, since E[αi|trainij = 1] 6= 0.
Instead, the approach taken here is to average the estimated individual fixed
effects for a set of 322 districts, and use the arguably exogenous variation in shares
of individuals with different trainings across these districts to identify the training
effects δj. Using equation (C.2.1), the average of δi in district d is given by
δ¯di = s
d
j=1δj=1 + ...+ s
d
j=13δj=13 + α¯
d
i
= (1− sdj=2 − sdj=3 − ...)δj=1 + ...+ sdj=13δj=13 + α¯di
= δj=1 + s
d
j=2(δj=2 − δj=1) + ...+ sdj=13(δj=13 − δj=1) + α¯di , (C.2.2)
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where sdj denotes the share of individuals trained in j in district d.
Based on equation (C.2.2), I run the following regression:
ˆ¯δdi = δr + δ1 + δ2s
d
j=2 + ...+ δ13s
d
j=13 + β
′Xd + α¯di + 
d, (C.2.3)
where ˆ¯δdi is the empirical counterpart of δ¯
d
i , Xd includes district-level control variables
for population and population density, δr is a fixed effect for the region district d
belongs to, α¯di is the average of individual fixed effects in district d, and 
d is a mean
zero error term. Results from the estimation of equation (C.2.3) are presented in
Appendix F.1.4.
The key assumption for this regression to identify the training effects δj is that
differences in shares across districts are exogenous and therefore E[α¯di |sdj ] = 0. This
is equivalent to assuming that average ability levels are the same across districts,
but structural differences generate exogenous variation in sdj .
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Appendix D. Estimation Details
D.1 Reduction of Dimensionality
As in the Section 5.1, define the joint cumulative distribution of the outcome and
selection error terms as Fjk(...), and the joint cumulative distribution of the outcome
error and the two maximum order statistics as Gjk(...). Evaluating Fjk(...) at the
observed value function and utility differences, the equivalence between Fjk(...) and
Gjk(...) in equation (5.6) can be established with the following steps:
Fjk(z0, V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ..., V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 , U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt)
= Pr(ijkrt ≤ z0, ei1r0t0 − eiJr0t0 ≤ V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ..., eiJr0t0 − eijr0t0 ≤ V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 ,
eij1rt − eijkrt ≤ U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., eijKrt − eijkrt ≤ U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt)
= Pr(ijkrt ≤ z0,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0) ≤ 0,
max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt) ≤ 0|
V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt)
= Gjk(z0, 0, 0|V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt).
(D.1.1)
This equivalence may also be written in terms of density functions:
fjk(ijkrt, ei1r0t0 − eijr0t0 , ..., eiJr0t0 − eijr0t0 , eij1rt − eijkrt, ..., eij1rt − eijKrt|
V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt)
= gjk(jkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt)|
V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt). (D.1.2)
Given the one-to-one mapping between the selection probabilities and the observed
utility and value function differences, the joint distribution gjk(...) may be condi-
tioned on (pi1r0t0 , ..., pijr0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(k|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt), where pijr0t0 is
the probability of selcting into training j at time t0, and pi(k|j)rt is the probability of
selecting into occupation k conditional on training j at time t:
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= gjk(jkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt)|
V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt).
= gjk(jkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt)|
pi1r0t0 , ..., pijr0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(k|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt). (D.1.3)
Rewriting the joint distribution gjk(...) in this way captures the fact that the vector
of selection probabilities contains the same information as the observed utility and
value function differences.
D.2 Non-Parametric Control Function
Proof for Section 5.2 : λjk(pi1r0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt) = λjk(pijr0t0 , pi(k|j)rt).
For notational convenience, denote ~V = (V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0) and
~U = (U˜i(1|j)rt− U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt− U˜i(k|j)rt). Using the definition of gjk(...) as joint
distribution of the outcome error and maximum order statistics, the control function
may be written as
λjk(pi1r0t0 , ..., piJr0t0 , pi(1|j)rt, ..., pi(K|j)rt)
= E[ijkrt|Mijkrt = 1]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
t1
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
gjk(t1, t2, t3|Mijkrt = 1, ~V , ~U)dt2dt3dt1
=
∫∞
−∞ t1
∫ 0
−∞
∫ 0
−∞ gjk(t1, t2, t3|~V , ~U)dt2dt3dt1
Pr(Mijkrt = 1|~V , ~U)
,
where the final equality follows from Bayes’ Theorem, and the denominator
Pr(Mijkrt|~V , ~U) = pijr0t0 × pi(k|j)rt. Under the index sufficiency assumption (A1),
gjk(ijkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt|~V , ~U)
= gjk(ijkrt,max
j′
(V˜ij′r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 + eij′r0t0 − eijr0t0),max
k′
(U˜i(k′|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt + eijk′rt − eijkrt|
pijr0t0 , pi(k|j)rt).
As a result, the control function λjk(...) only depends on probabilities pijr0t0 and
pi(k|j)rt.
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D.3 Parametric Control Function
Recall that the selection problem is given by
Mijkrt = 1 iff max
j′
(Vij′r0t0 − Vijr0t0) ≤ 0 and max
k′
(Ui(k′|j)rt − Ui(k|j)rt) ≤ 0.
(D.3.1)
Lee (1983) points out that it is possible to create new random variables based on
the distribution of the maximum order statistics.2 I use Dahl’s (2002) notation and
adapt Lee’s (1983) approach to the present selection problem. To do so, define the
marginal distribution of the selection errors as Ljk(...), and the marginal distribution
of the two maximum order statistics as Hjk(...). Denote the corresponding density
functions by ljk(...) and hjk(...), respectively. Using Lee’s (1983) insight on maximum
order statistics, and evaluating Ljk(...) at the observed utility and value function
differences, the distribution may be written as
Ljk(V˜ijrt0 − V˜i1rt0 + z1, ...., V˜ijrt0 − V˜iJrt0 + z1,
U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt + z2, ..., U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt + z2)
= Pr(ei1r0t0 − eijr0t0 ≤ V˜ijrt0 − V˜i1r0t0 + z1, ..., eiJr0t0 − eijr0t0 ≤ V˜ijrt0 − V˜iJrt0 + z1,
eij1rt − eijkrt ≤ U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt + z2, ..., eijKrt − eijkrt ≤ U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt + z2)
= Pr(max
j′
(Vij′r0t0 − Vijr0t0) ≤ z1,max
k′
(Ui(k′|j)rt − Ui(k|j)rt) ≤ z2|
V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt)
= Hjk(z1, z2|V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt).
(D.3.2)
Now define the random variables ζijkrt as
ζijkrt = Γ
−1
jk {Hjk(0, 0|V˜i1r0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 , ...., V˜iJr0t0 − V˜ijr0t0 ,
U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(k|j)rt)}, (D.3.3)
where Γjk is any continuous cumulative distribution function. Based on the above
transformation, the selection problem may be written as
Mijkrt = 1 iff ζijkrt ≤ Γ−1jk {Ljk(V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ...., V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 ,
U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt)},
(D.3.4)
2See Appendix A in Dahl (2002) for details.
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where Ljk(...) is evaluated at the observed value function and utility differences.
The key step in Lee’s (1983) approach is then to assume that the vector
(ijkrt, ζijkrt) is independent and identically distributed with joint cumulative distri-
bution function Gjk(...), thereby specifying the joint distribution of outcome and
selection errors Fjk(...). Importantly, the distribution function Gjk(..) is not allowed
to vary with the observed utility and value function differences, i.e. the same trans-
formation is applied to maximum order statistics regardless of the specific values for
V˜i1r0t0−V˜ijr0t0 , ... and U˜i(1|j)rt−U˜i(k|j)rt, .... Dahl (2002) shows that this simplification
is equivalent to assumption (A2). Using this assumption, the joint distrbution of
outcome and selection errors Fjk(...) may be written as
Fjk(z0, V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ..., V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 , U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., U˜i(1|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt)
= Pr(ijkrt ≤ z0, ei1r0t0 − eijr0t0 ≤ V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ..., eiJr0t0 − eijr0t0 ≤ V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 ,
eij1rt − eijkrt ≤ U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., eijKrt − eijkrt ≤ U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt)
= Pr(ijkrt ≤ z0, ζijkrt ≤ Γ−1jk {Ljk(V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ..., V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 ,
U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(K|j)rt)})
= Gjk(z0,Γ
−1
jk {Ljk(V˜ijr0t0 − V˜i1r0t0 , ...., V˜ijr0t0 − V˜iJr0t0 ,
U˜i(k|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt, ..., U˜i(K|j)rt − U˜i(1|j)rt)}). (D.3.5)
The final step involves making parametric assumptions on the distributions Γjk(...)
and Gjk(...). As described in Section 5.3, I follow Lee (1983) and assume that Γjk(...)
is a univariate standard normal cdf and Gjk(...) is a bivariate standard normal cdf.
D.4 Random Forest Algorithm
Leo Breiman’s and Adele Cutler’s random forest algorithm belongs to the class of
supervised machine learning algorithms and is commonly used in prediction problems
with categorical dependent variables. Random forests operate by constructing a
large number of decision trees based on different samples of observations which are
combined to give as an outcome the average prediction of all trees. In doing so,
random forests avoid problems of overfitting.
Individual trees are grown using an optimal splitting algorithm where explanatory
variables are first selected and then split according to the algorithm, resulting in
new branches starting from an original node. This process is repeated until no
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explanatory variable meets the selection criteria.3
In order to account for sampling variation due to the estimation of the selection
probabilities when conducting inference in the outcome equations, I randomly select
50% of the individuals as training dataset. I then use the training dataset to grow
separate random forests for the training and occupation choice using the explana-
tory variables described in Section 5.5.4 While training choice is predicted using
a single observation for each individual, occupation choices are predicted using all
employment spells of the selected individuals. In a second step, the resulting forests
are applied to the remaining 50% of the sample, the test dataset. Probability pre-
dictions for each training or occupation option are then computed as the proportion
of votes for that option across all trees in the final nodes.
3For details, see Hastie et al. (2009).
4Both random forests are based on 500 trees, where 1000 randomly selected observations from
the training dataset are used to grow each tree.
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Appendix E. Occupation-Specific
Experience
E.1 Dynamic Model
When occupation-specific experience expk affects productivity, the occupational
choice problem becomes dynamic. Consider the following specifications for log wages:
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + δk + τDj=k + βexpk + ijkrt, (v)
ln(wijkrt) = δr + δt + f(vackrt) + δi + δk + τ
expkDj=k + ijkrt, (vi)
where, for simplicity, other controls have been omitted. As before, Dj=k is a dummy
variable equal to one if training j is the same as occupation k. Model (v) controls for
occupation-specific experience expk, model (vi) estimates different effects of working
on versus off the diagonal for each occupation-specific experience level. Including
expk in this way captures the intuition that even if one is not trained in the current
occupation, there may be occupation-specific learning while working in an occupa-
tion k, which could affect productivity directly or change the wage gap relative to
co-workers who received the relevant training.
Assume that that the period-t utility when working in occupation k is given
by equation (3.6) in Section 3.3. Given the wage structure from models (v) and
(vi), current period occupation choices affect future utility and the choice problem
becomes dynamic. Define the value function of occupation choice k given information
Ωrt available at time t, and denote this by Vi(k|j)rt(Ωrt). For any occupation choice
k, Vi(k|j)rt(Ωrt) may be written as
Vi(k|j)rt(Ωrt) = U˜i(k|j)rt + eijkrt + βEt[Vi(k|j)r(t+1)|Ωrt], (E.1.1)
where β denotes a discount factor and Et[Vi(k|j)r(t+1)|Ωrt] is the maximal expected
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reward in t+ 1 given today’s occupation choice.
Individual i maximises expected utility and chooses occupation k if and only if
(eijkrt − eijk′rt) >(U˜i(k|j)rt + βEt[Vi(k|j)r(t+1)|Ωrt])− (U˜i(k′|j)rt + βEt[Vi(k′|j)r(t+1)|Ωrt])
= V˜i(k′|j)rt − V˜i(k|j)rt, ∀k′ 6= k, (E.1.2)
where V˜i(k|j)rt denotes the conditional value function Vi(k|j)rt−eijkrt. The occupation
dummy variable may then be defined by replacing Ui(k|j)rt with Vi(k|j)rt in equation
(3.10). The training choice problem will be analoguous to Section 3.4.
E.2 Identification
Controlling for occupation-specific experience expk in the outcome equation as in
model (v) and (vi) may lead to an additional source of bias resulting from the
endogeneity of past selection. The selection problem from equation (4.1) in Chapter
4 may then be written as
E[ijkrt|Mijkrt = 1, expk] 6= 0. (E.2.1)
In order to see why randomising individuals into a specific training and occupation
will not be enough to overcome this bias, consider again the simplified example
from Section 4.2, but focus now on the estimation of model (vi) from Section E.1.
Consider now combining the experiments from Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 such that
individuals are first randomly allocated to a training j, and subsequently randomly
allocated to an occupation k. Given a specific level of occupation-specific experience
in occupation k = 1, the selection bias in estimating paramter τ expk may be written
as
E[i1|traini1 = 1, exp1]− E[i1|traini1 = 0, exp1]
= E[i1| (exp1|traini1 = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
obtained exp. in occ. 1
cond. on training 1
]− E[i1| (exp1|traini1 = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
obtained exp. in occ. 1
cond. on training 2
] ≤ 0. (E.2.2)
Intuitively, even though training is randomly allocated, comparing individuals with
the same level of experience in occupation k = 1 on versus off the diagonal leads
to bias as both sets of workers acquired that experience conditional on different
trainings j = 1 and j = 2. As in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the final inequality
follows from the assumptions made on the error terms. The proof from Appendix
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B.1 easily extends to equation (E.2.2) as occupation-specific experience corresponds
to repeated past selection into occupations.
As a result, an additional instrument is required to account for the endogeneity
of expk when estimating models (v) and (vi). In line with occupation-specific expe-
rience being equivalent to repeated past selection into occupations, I use the average
of past shocks to vacancies outside the current occupation as an instrument for expk:
IVexpk = 1/(t− 1)
t−1∑
s=t0
(vack′rs − Et0 [vack′rs|Ωr0t0 ]), ∀k′ 6= k. (E.2.3)
The instrument is based on the intuition that higher average numbers of past vacan-
cies outside occupation k will lead to lower accumulated experience in occupation k.
Given the structure of the sequential selection problem, the identification assump-
tions discussed in Section 4.4 can be easily extended to IVexpk .
E.3 Estimation
When controlling for occupation-specific experience in the outcome equation, the
control function needs to be adapted to take into account the potential endogeneity
of expk. Following a common approach in the literature (see e.g. Gathmann &
Scho¨nberg (2010) and Dustmann & Meghir (2005)), I assume that the regression
error term uijkrt from equations (5.8) and (5.10) which, given the inclusion of expk
will no longer be mean-zero, may be written as
E[uijkrt|expk] = ρ1vˆ, (E.3.1)
where vˆ = expk − ˆexpk is the residual after predicting the endogenous variable
expk with the instruments described in Section E.2. In the present context, this is
equivalent to assuming linear separability in the control functions for the training
and occupation choice, and the control function for expk, such that the full regression
error term may be written as
E[ijkrt|Mijkrt = 1, expk] = λjk(pijr0t0 , pi(k|j)rt) + ρ1vˆ. (E.3.2)
While common in the literature, the imposed linearity in vˆ is a strong assumption
(Imbens & Wooldridge (2007)). I will therefore only rely on this modification of the
control function approach in a small set of results and the majority of my findings
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will focus on the full effect of working in a specific jk-cell which includes the effect
of any occupation-specific experience accumulated as a result of the cell choice.
E.4 Estimating the Selection Probabilities
In order to implement the full control function approach for models (v) and (vi),
the residuals vˆ = expk − ˆexpk need to be estimated. To do so, I use the training
choice trainij, the training instruments IVtrainj , the occupation-specific experience
instruments IVexpk as well as past shocks in the current occupation k, and controls
Xijkrt as explanatory variables to predict expk using a random forest algorithm.
Since expk is a continuous variable, the regression version of the algorithm is used.
Reduced form error terms vˆ will then be given by the difference between the actual
and predicted values of occupation-specific experience.
In a second step, I also include the occupation-specific experience instruments
IVexpk as explanatory variables to predict occi(k|j)rt and obtain new estimates for the
occupation selection probabilitites pi(k|j)rt. With vˆ and pˆi(k|j)rt at hand, the control
function approach may be implemented as outlined in Chapter 5 and Section E.3.
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Appendix F. Empirical Analysis
F.1 Further Results
F.1.1 Heterogeneity by Occupation-Specific Experience
The results for model (v) in Section E.1 are reported and discussed in Section 6.1 (see
Table 6.1, columns (3) and (4)). Figure F.5 plots the results for model (vi), where
a separate coefficient τ expk has been estimated for each yearly occupation-specific
experience bin. Each coefficient compares workers with a specific level of experience
in their current occupation who were trained in that occupation to workers with the
same level of experience in their current occupation who were not trained in that
occupation.
Coefficient estimates are shown for the parametric control function estimator
that takes into account the potential endogeneity of both the selection into a spe-
cific jk-cell and the occupation-specific experience parameter expk (see Chapter
5 and Appendix E.2 to E.4). In line with the results from column (4) in Table
6.1 in Section 6.1, the magnitude of the set of coefficients by occupation-specific
experience is lower than the corresponding coefficients by experience. Moreover,
coefficients are fairly constant in early years which is consistent with the accumula-
tion of occupation-specific experience suggested to explain the patterns in Section
6.2. Given the structure of the dataset, comparisons of the two series become more
difficult at higher levels of occupation-specific experience as the samples become in-
creasingly similar. Nonetheless, the pattern suggests that even after accounting for
occupation-specific experience, there is no full catch-up for workers who were not
trained in their current occupation, and sizeable differences remain after more than
20 years of work experience.
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Figure F.1: On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns by Total and Occ.-Spec. Experience
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Notes: The figure plots regression coefficient estimates for τexpk from model (vi), where occupation-
specific experience levels have been binned into yearly categories. Coefficients are estimated using
the parametric control function estimator which takes into account the potential endogeneity of
occupation-specific experience. Results are based on the baseline sample, further excluding years
where the instruments are not available (see Section 5.4), and restricting the sample to spells
which started after the end of an apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test
sample (see Appendix D.4). Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation
distribution in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the region and time level. 95% confidence
intervals are shown.
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F.1.2 Heterogeneity by Training
Figure F.2: Average Return and Estimated Selection Bias by Training
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Notes: The figure plots average on- versus off-diagonal returns for each training from Figure 6.3
against the estimated selection bias, i.e. the difference between the returns estimated without
selection control and those estimated using the parametric control function estimator. The fitted
line corresponds to a weighted OLS regression using the sample fraction in each training as weights.
Marker size is proportional to the weights.
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F.1.3 Full Training-Occupation Matrix
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Table F.1: Full Matrix of Returns - Within Training, No Select. Control
Occupation
01-09 10-54 19-32 31 33-37 39-43 44-51 60-63 68-70 71-74 75-78 79-89 90-93
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
01-09 0 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.14 −0.00 0.05 0.09 0.06∗∗ −0.00 0.06 0.02 −0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
10-54 −0.27∗∗∗ 0 −0.08∗ −0.11 −0.03 −0.06 −0.15∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.06∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.12)
19-32 −0.07∗ 0.03 0 0.03 0.06 −0.01 0.01 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.00 0.09∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
31 −0.04 0.06∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0 −0.04 0.08∗ −0.02 0.17∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 0.19∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.07
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
33-37 −0.12 0.03 0.11∗∗ −0.11 0 −0.20 0.09 0.10∗ 0.02 −0.05 0.06 −0.01 −0.30∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.05) (0.04) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
39-43 0.00 0.02 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07 0.02 0 0.10∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07 −0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
44-51 −0.08∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.01 −0.05∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.05 0 0.07∗∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.07∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
60-63 −0.03 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.09∗∗ −0.11 −0.00 −0.04 0 0.06 −0.10∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.13∗ −0.50∗∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.17)
68-70 −0.27∗∗∗ −0.03 0.08∗∗ 0.08 0.00 −0.08 −0.02 0.10∗∗∗ 0 −0.02 0.01 −0.08∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04)
71-74 −0.17 −0.05 −0.01 −0.12 −0.08∗ −0.17 0.03 0.07 0.00 0 0.01 −0.04 −0.20
(0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.19) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.15)
75-78 −0.36∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.15∗∗ −0.22 −0.21∗ −0.02 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0 −0.05∗ −0.37∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.29) (0.10) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
79-89 −0.21∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.06∗ 0.12 −0.24∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.10 0.04 0.00 −0.09∗∗ −0.03 0 −0.47∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
90-93 −0.08 0.23∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0
(0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates τˆjk from model (iv), estimated without selection control. Results are based on the baseline sample,
restricting the sample to spells which started after the end of an apprenticeship. Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation
distribution in 2010. Results are shown for the five largest occupations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region and time level.
Given the low number of clusters, critical values of the t(9)-distribution are used. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.2: Full Matrix of Returns - Within Training, Param. Select. Control
Occupation
01-09 10-54 19-32 31 33-37 39-43 44-51 60-63 68-70 71-74 75-78 79-89 90-93
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
01-09 0 −0.73∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗ −0.08 −0.30 −0.03 0.19 −0.18∗ −0.54∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗∗ −0.46∗ −0.75∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.67) (0.24) (0.18) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.22) (0.21)
10-54 0.33 0 −0.07 −0.41 0.42 0.23 0.49∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗ −0.01 0.17 0.08 −0.45∗
(0.23) (0.16) (0.23) (0.67) (0.32) (0.23) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22)
19-32 0.36 −0.02 0 −0.05 0.41 0.32 0.43∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.06 0.20∗∗ 0.05 −0.12
(0.22) (0.08) (0.09) (0.44) (0.18) (0.14) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.14)
31 0.46∗ 0.02 0.12 0 0.49 0.42 0.53∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.11 0.35∗∗ 0.18 0.05
(0.24) (0.11) (0.10) (0.56) (0.24) (0.22) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)
33-37 −0.49 −0.72∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗ −0.77∗∗ 0 −0.37 0.13 0.07 −0.18 −0.59∗∗∗ −0.50∗ −0.60∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.22) (0.19) (0.26) (0.57) (0.32) (0.22) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.25) (0.26)
39-43 0.62∗ −0.00 0.21 −0.06 0.56 0 0.73∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.22 0.35∗∗ 0.29 0.09
(0.28) (0.15) (0.18) (0.20) (0.75) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.26) (0.23)
44-51 0.11 −0.42∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.37∗∗ 0.03 −0.03 0 0.33∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.28∗∗ −0.15 −0.27∗ −0.44∗∗
(0.22) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.59) (0.19) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.16)
60-63 −0.26 −1.08∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗ −1.04∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.42 −0.17 0 −0.31∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ −1.07∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.66) (0.34) (0.32) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.13) (0.25)
68-70 0.08 −0.28∗ −0.10 −0.15 0.22 0.04 0.36∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0 −0.13 −0.04 −0.13 −0.39∗∗
(0.30) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.53) (0.25) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17) (0.16)
71-74 0.85∗ 0.05 0.29 −0.19 0 0.33 0.83∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0 0.37 0.42 0.13
(0.45) (0.28) (0.31) (0.34) (0.41) (0.26) (0.31) (0.30) (0.25) (0.41) (0.44)
75-78 −0.22 −0.59∗∗∗ −0.37∗ −0.68∗∗∗ −0.13 −0.26 0.13 0.24∗∗ 0.01 −0.39∗∗∗ 0 −0.30∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.47) (0.28) (0.25) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
79-89 −0.63∗∗ −1.00∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −0.50 −0.72∗∗ −0.43∗ −0.27∗ −0.49∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ 0 −1.22∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.55) (0.28) (0.23) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
90-93 0.06 −0.16 0.01 −0.01 0.36 0.08 0.58∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.23 −0.08 −0.01 −0.01 0
(0.29) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.57) (0.25) (0.24) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.13)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates τˆjk from model (iv), estimated using the parametric selection control described in Section 5.3. Results
are based on the baseline sample, further excluding years where the instruments are not available (see Section 5.4) and restricting the sample to spells
which started after the end of an apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test sample (see Appendix D.4). Observations are
weighted using the empirical training-occupation distribution in 2010. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the region and time level.
Given the low number of clusters, critical values of the t(9)-distribution are used. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure F.3: Full Matrix of Returns and Sample Fraction
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Notes: The figure plots training-occupation cell returns against the within-training sample fraction
of workers in the relevant occupation for each off-diagonal training-occupation pair. The fitted line
corresponds to a weighted OLS regression where each training-occupation pair is weighted by the
fraction of total workers in that cell. Marker size is proportional to the weights.
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F.1.4 On-Diagonal Returns
Figure F.4 presents the results from equation (C.2.3) in Appendix C.2, where the
omitted share is the one for the largest training, office workers. It can be seen that
while many trainings appear to have on-diagonal returns which are similar to the one
for office workers, there are significant differences on either side. The highest level
effect is estimated for technical and laboratory workers, the lowest for food prepara-
tion workers.
Figure F.4: On-Diagonal Returns Across Trainings
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Notes: The figure plots results from a district-level regression (equation (C.2.3)) which controls
for population size and density. All coefficients are relative to training as office workers. Standard
errors are clustered at the region level. 95% confidence intervals shown.
F.1.5 Within-Occupation Comparisons
Table F.3 adds the estimated level effects δˆj to the coefficient estimates from Table
6.2 in Section 6.4, and displays the resulting sums (τˆjk + δˆj). Table F.4 further sub-
stracts the on-diagonal effect in each occupation (τˆjk+ δˆj)−(τˆj′k+ δˆj′), j′ = k, so that
the coefficients can be interpreted relative to the diagonal within each occupation. It
can be seen that the majority of coefficients is negative, suggesting that workers who
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were trained in other occupations incur wage penalties relative to their co-workers
in that same occupation who also went through the relevant training. Comparing
the coefficients in all five occupations suggests that health and social workers are
the occupation in which workers with training in other occupations incur the largest
wage penalties. Perhaps surprisingly, there are two significant positive coefficients,
for construction workers trained as craft workers or sales and financial workers.
However, note that construction workers is by far the smallest occupation amongst
the ones displayed and only about 2%/0.3% of its workers were trained as craft
workers/sales and financial workers, respectively.
Table F.3: Full Matrix of Returns - Added Effects, Param. Select. Control
Occupation
Office Craft Sales, financ. Health Constr.
workers workers workers workers workers
T
ra
in
in
g
Office workers 0 −0.37∗ 0.01 −0.30∗∗ 0.13
(0.0840) (0.9201) (0.0461) (0.6169)
Craft workers −0.00 −0.20 0.19 −0.15 0.23
(0.9936) (0.5146) (0.5659) (0.6621) (0.5131)
Sales, financ. w. 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.54
(0.6798) (0.8013) (0.5688) (0.8793) (0.1495)
Health, social w. −0.24 −0.41 0.04 0.53∗∗ 0.09
(0.3483) (0.1263) (0.8837) (0.0365) (0.7424)
Construction w. −0.51∗ −0.59∗∗ −0.28 −0.62∗∗ −0.35
(0.0735) (0.0223) (0.3292) (0.0303) (0.1815)
Notes: The table shows the sum of coefficients τˆjk from model (iv), estimated using the parametric
selection control described in Section 5.3 (see Table 6.2), and δˆj from equation (C.2.3) (see Figure
F.4). Results are shown for the five largest occupations. Standard errors are clustered at the
region and time level. p-values for the test (τjk + δj) = 0 are shown in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.4: Full Matrix of Returns - Within Occupation, Param. Select. Control
Occupation
Office Craft Sales, financ. Health Constr.
workers workers workers workers workers
T
ra
in
in
g
Office workers 0 −0.17 −0.17 −0.83∗∗ 0.48
(0.6963) (0.6263) (0.0309) (0.2177)
Craft workers −0.00 0 0.01 −0.68∗ 0.58∗∗
(0.9936) (0.9696) (0.0647) (0.0254)
Sales, financ. w. 0.14 0.29 0 −0.47 0.89∗∗∗
(0.6798) (0.2393) (0.1194) (0.0089)
Health, social w. −0.24 −0.20 −0.14 0 0.44
(0.3483) (0.4690) (0.5509) (0.1062)
Construction w. −0.51∗ −0.39∗ −0.46∗ −1.15∗∗∗ 0
(0.0735) (0.0588) (0.0623) (0.0002)
Notes: The table shows the sum of coefficients τˆjk from model (iv), estimated using the parametric
selection control described in Section 5.3 (see Table 6.2), and δˆj from equation (C.2.3) (see Figure
F.4), further substracting the on-diagonal coefficient in the same column. Results are shown for the
five largest occupations. Standard errors are clustered at the region and time level. p-values for the
test (τjk + δj)− (δj′ + τj′k) = 0, j′ = k, are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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F.2 Further Robustness
Table F.5 shows further robustness results relating to the estimation method. Col-
umn (1) approximates the skill price in occupation k using a tenth order polynomial
instead of the fourth order polynomial used throughout Chapter 6. This functional
form change leaves the baseline estimate unchanged at 12.3%. Column (2) allows
the parametric control function estimator to vary across all training-occupation cells.
The resulting on- versus off-diagonal is only slightly lower at around 10%. Columns
(3) and (4) address two of the identification concerns discussed in Section 4.4.1,
showing that the inclusion of occupation times time or industry times time fixed
effects does not appreciably change the baseline result of 12.3%.
Figure F.5 provides a comparison between the slope estimates from τ exp from (ii)
under no selection control, the parametric selection and the non-parametric selection
control where, in contrast to Figure 6.2 in Section 6.2, the probability of selection
into one’s training occupation pi(k=j|j)rt has been added as additional term in the
non-parametric control function (see Sections 5.1 and 6.2). It can be seen that the
slope estimates when using the additional probability in the non-parametric control
function are very similar to those in Figure 6.2, closely mapping the slope estimates
obtained when using the parametric selection control. This result provides further
support to the distributional assumptions made.
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Table F.5: Average On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns - Estimation Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10th-order full set of occ. x time ind. x time
polynomial cf cells FE FE
Dj=k = 1 0.1227
∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗∗ 0.1322∗∗∗ 0.1159∗∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0304) (0.0354) (0.0325)
exp 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0598∗∗∗ 0.0587∗∗∗ 0.0577∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0049)
exp2 −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Indiv./Reg. FE yes yes yes yes
Occ. FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes
Occ. x Time FE yes
Ind. x Time FE yes
Parametric cf yes yes yes yes
p-value cf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1,143,782 1,143,782 1,143,782 1,142,384
Notes: The table reports regression results from model (i). Column (1) controls for a tenth order
polynomial in own vacancies. Column (2) allows the control function to vary for the full set of
training-occupation cells. Column (3) includes a full set of 14 industry fixed effects in the regression.
Results are based on the baseline sample, further excluding years where the instruments are not
available (see Section 5.4) and restricting the sample to spells which started after the end of an
apprenticeship. 50% of observations are randomly selected as test sample (see Appendix D.4).
Observations are weighted using the empirical training-occupation distribution in 2010. Standard
errors are clustered at the region and time level (columns (1), (2) and (3)), or at the region and
time and industry level (column (4)). ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure F.5: Norm. On- versus Off-Diagonal Returns by Experience - Robustness
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Notes: The figure plots regression coefficient estimates for τexp from model (iii), where experience
levels have been binned into yearly categories. All coefficient estimates are normalised to zero at
zero years of work experience. In contrast to Figure 6.2 in Section 6.2, the non-parametric control
function estimator also includes the on-diagonal probability pi(k=j|j)rt. Results are based on the
baseline sample, further excluding years where the instruments are not available (see Section 5.4),
and restricting the sample to spells which started after the end of an apprenticeship. 50% of
observations are randomly selected as test sample (see Appendix D.4). Observations are weighted
using the empirical training-occupation distribution in 2010.
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Appendix G. Task Content
G.1 Descriptives
Table G.1: Training-Occupation Distances - Selected Categories
Statistics Training j Occupation k Distjk
Overall mean 0.3418
Standard dev. 0.1549
Weight. mean 0.2774
Craft workers Electrical workers 0.0138
Craft workers Construction workers 0.0364
Construction workers Electrical workers 0.0409
Craft workers Process, plant workers 0.0742
Food prep. workers Textile, garment workers 0.0768
. . .
. . .
. . .
Process, plant workers Personal service workers 0.5527
Office workers Craft workers 0.5566
Office workers Process, plant workers 0.5576
Craft workers Personal service workers 0.5616
Office workers Textile, garment workers 0.5949
Notes: The table reports summary statistics on the distance measure Distjk, and distances for the
five most similar and the five most distant training-occupation pairs. Distjk is computed using
survey waves 1885/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99.
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Table G.2: Training-Occupation Distances - Five Largest Occupations
Occupation
Office Craft Sales, financ. Health Constr.
workers workers workers workers workers
T
ra
in
in
g
Office workers 0
Craft workers 0.56 0
Sales, financ. w. 0.10 0.54 0
Health, social w. 0.16 0.44 0.21 0
Construction w. 0.53 0.04 0.49 0.44 0
Notes: The table reports the distance measure Distjk, computed using survey waves 1885/86,
1991/92 and 1998/99, for the five largest occupations.
Table G.3: Training Specificity
Statistics Training j Specj
Overall mean 0.3030
Weight. mean 0.2657
Office workers 0.2109
Craft workers 0.2894
Sales, financial workers 0.2169
Health, social workers 0.2327
Construction workers 0.2755
Process, plant workers 0.3482
Transport, storage workers 0.4096
Technical, lab. workers 0.2224
Electrical workers 0.2555
Personal service workers 0.4518
Food preparation workers 0.3218
Agricultural workers 0.3562
Textile, garment workers 0.3483
Notes: The table reports the specificity measure Specj , computed using survey waves 1885/86,
1991/92 and 1998/99, for each training j.
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Table G.4: Training Upward Specificity
Statistics Training j Specj|Up
Overall mean 0.3041
Office workers 0.1132
Craft workers 0.2767
Sales, financial workers 0.2075
Health, social workers 0.1407
Construction workers 0.2499
Process, plant workers 0.4616
Transport, storage workers 0.4094
Technical, lab. workers na
Electrical workers 0.3022
Personal service workers 0.4593
Food preparation workers 0.3524
Agricultural workers 0.3541
Textile, garment workers 0.3524
Notes: The table reports the upward specificity measure Specj|Up, computed using survey waves
1885/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99, for each training j.
Table G.5: Training Downward Specificity
Statistics Training j Specj|Down
Overall mean 0.2884
Office workers 0.5029
Craft workers 0.3163
Sales, financial workers 0.2177
Health, social workers 0.2360
Construction workers 0.3321
Process, plant workers 0.1917
Transport, storage workers 0.4331
Technical, lab. workers 0.2224
Electrical workers 0.1578
Personal service workers 0.4113
Food preparation workers na
Agricultural workers 0.3633
Textile, garment workers 0.0768
Notes: The table reports the downward specificity measure Specj|Down for each training j, com-
puted using survey waves 1885/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99.
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G.2 Further Results
Table G.6: Match Returns and Task Dist. - No Select. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distjk −0.0202∗ −0.0198∗∗ −0.0031 −0.0173∗ −0.0043
(0.0104) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0093)
Distjk ×Downjk −0.0352 −0.0278
(0.0242) (0.0266)
Downjk −0.1011∗∗∗ −0.0987∗∗∗ −0.0247 −0.0260
(0.0175) (0.0188) (0.0313) (0.0336)
Dirjk −0.0515∗∗ −0.0492∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0190)
Dir2jk 0.0029 0.0034
(0.0055) (0.0060)
Mean of τˆjk −0.0188 −0.0188 −0.0188 −0.0188 −0.0188
Train. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.3369 0.4192 0.4252 0.4721 0.4746
N 156 156 156 156 156
Notes: The table reports regression results from equation (7.10), where the dependent variable τjk
has been estimated without selection control. Distjk is constructed using survey waves 1985/86,
1991/92 and 1998/99, and scaled by its standard deviation. Diagonal coefficients (where τˆjk = 0
and Distjk = 0) have not been included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the
training level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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G.3 Robustness
Table G.7: Match Returns and Task Dist. - Incl. On-Diag., No Select. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distjk −0.0164 −0.0090 0.0069 −0.0139 −0.0034
(0.0109) (0.0086) (0.0077) (0.0084) (0.0095)
Distjk ×Downjk −0.0454∗ −0.0293
(0.0209) (0.0242)
Downjk −0.0929∗∗∗ −0.0955∗∗∗ −0.0203 −0.0283
(0.0144) (0.0176) (0.0258) (0.0326)
Dirjk −0.0519∗∗∗ −0.0473∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0175)
Dir2jk 0.0036 0.0038
(0.0055) (0.0056)
Mean of τˆjk −0.0174 −0.0174 −0.0174 −0.0174 −0.0174
Train. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.3087 0.3867 0.4044 0.4514 0.4565
N 169 169 169 169 169
Notes: The table reports regression results from equation (7.10), where the dependent variable τjk
has been estimated without selection control. Distjk is constructed using survey waves 1985/86,
1991/92 and 1998/99, and scaled by its standard deviation. Diagonal coefficients (where τˆjk = 0
and Distjk = 0) have been included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the training
level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table G.8: Match Returns and Task Dist. - Incl. On-Diag., Select. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distjk −0.0394∗ −0.0294∗ 0.0134 −0.0520∗∗ −0.0176
(0.0218) (0.0162) (0.0289) (0.0179) (0.0314)
Distjk ×Downjk −0.1228∗∗ −0.0964∗
(0.0493) (0.0490)
Downjk −0.1254∗∗ −0.1326∗∗ −0.0216 −0.0480
(0.0498) (0.0501) (0.0564) (0.0541)
Dirjk −0.0677∗∗∗ −0.0526∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0188)
Dir2jk 0.0469
∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0076)
Mean of τˆjk −0.0726 −0.0726 −0.0726 −0.0726 −0.0726
Train. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.5585 0.5694 0.5811 0.6230 0.6291
N 169 169 169 169 169
Notes: The table reports regression results from equation (7.10), where the dependent variable
τjk has been estimated using the parametric control function estimator. Distjk is constructed
using survey waves 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99, and scaled by its standard deviation. Diagonal
coefficients (where τˆjk = 0 and Distjk = 0) have been included in the regression. Standard errors
are clustered at the training level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table G.9: Match Returns and Task Dist. - Largest Trainings, No Select. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distjk −0.0145 −0.0124 −0.0028 −0.0078 −0.0029
(0.0131) (0.0073) (0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0109)
Distjk ×Downjk −0.0212 −0.0110
(0.0250) (0.0269)
Downjk −0.1055∗∗∗ −0.1082∗∗∗ −0.0386 −0.0419
(0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0299) (0.0327)
Dirjk −0.0522∗∗ 0.0509∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0194)
Dir2jk −0.0122 −0.0124
(0.0111) (0.0111)
Mean of τˆjk −0.0175 −0.0175 −0.0175 −0.0175 −0.0175
Train. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.3778 0.4733 0.4711 0.5155 0.5107
N 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: The table reports regression results from equation (7.10), restricting the sample to the
five largest trainings. The dependent variable τjk has been estimated without selection control.
Distjk is constructed using survey waves 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99, and scaled by its standard
deviation. Diagonal coefficients (where τˆjk = 0 and Distjk = 0) have not been included in the
regression. Standard errors are clustered at the training level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table G.10: Match Returns and Task Dist. - Largest Trainings, Select. Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distjk −0.0396∗ −0.0375∗∗ 0.0081 −0.0385∗∗ −0.0004
(0.0217) (0.0150) (0.0463) (0.0172) (0.0483)
Distjk ×Downjk −0.1009 −0.0857
(0.0878) (0.0870)
Downjk −0.1019 −0.1150∗∗ −0.0260 −0.0514
(0.0581) (0.0482) (0.0961) (0.0794)
Dirjk −0.0474 −0.0369
(0.0449) (0.0427)
Dir2jk 0.0554
∗∗ 0.0542∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0204)
Mean of τˆjk −0.0898 −0.0898 −0.0898 −0.0898 −0.0898
Train. FE yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.6596 0.6639 0.6679 0.6783 0.6801
N 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: The table reports regression results from equation (7.10), restricting the sample to the
five largest trainings. The dependent variable τjk has been estimated without selection control.
Distjk is constructed using survey waves 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99, and scaled by its standard
deviation. Diagonal coefficients (where τˆjk = 0 and Distjk = 0) have not been included in the
regression. Standard errors are clustered at the training level. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix H. Welfare and Policy
H.1 Retraining Calculations
Total costs in Euros
In 2010, the average annual cost per apprentice in the dual system was around
5, 280 Euros for firms and 6, 620 Euros for all government bodies.5 In terms of private
cost, the average yearly difference in earnings between an apprentice and a trained
worker early in their career was about 17, 560 Euros in 2010.6.
Net benefits in Euros
My estimates suggest that the annual average gain of retraining of τ corresponds
to 10% of wages for the average worker. The cost of a year of foregone work expe-
rience is 6%. Assuming that the effective foregone work experience of two years of
retraining is one year, the net gain of retraining is therefore equal to 4%. Based on
average yearly earnings of 45, 000 Euros in 2010, this amounts to 1, 800 Euros in 2010.
Cost-benefit calculations
Assuming a discount factor of 0.99, retraining costs would be recouped after
about 39 years of subsequent work in the new occupation:
29, 460 + β × 29, 460 = β2 × 1, 800× 1− β
t+1
1− β ,
t ≈ 39. (H.1.1)
Based on an average training completion age of 20, and a retirement age of 67, off-
diagonal workers would therefore need to switch out of their training occupation with
5Figures based on cpi adjusted 2012/13 figures. Source: Finanzierung der beruflichen Ausbil-
dung in Deutschland, BWP 2/2016, BiBB. Total net expenditures divided by total of 1.4 Mio.
apprentices.
6Figure computed as average difference in earnings between apprentices and trained workers
with less than ten years of full-time work experience in sample
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at most 6 years of work experience for retraining to be profitable (67−20−2−39 = 6
years). Using Figure 2.2 in Section 2.5, it can be seen that around 35% of workers
work off the diagonal by 6 years of experience. Based on a final share of 45%, this
corresponds to a fraction of over three quarters.
In addition, the return to working on versus off the diagonal only drops by around
1pp from its peek of 12.5% by six years of experience (see Figure 6.1 in Section 6.2).
Using the calculations in Section 8.1, this suggests that 18% of all workers are still
locked in at six years of expererience. Based on a final share of 20%, this corresponds
to a fraction of 90% of locked-in workers.
H.2 Information Provision
Recall the key friction in the proposed framework is the ex-ante imperfect informa-
tion at the time of training choice. Chapter 8 considers retraining as a potential
policy instrument. This section will briefly discuss the provision of ex-ante informa-
tion as an alternative policy intervention. Note that ex-ante information provision
may be a perfect substitute for costless retraining, at least in a model with only
a single second-stage occupation choice.7 With perfect information at the time of
training choice, retraining costs do not impact wages. Similarly, in the absence of
any retraining cost, imperfect information at the time of training choice does not
affect wage outcomes.
Albeit harder to quantify, the ex-ante provision of information at the time of
training choice is likely to be more cost-effective than ex-post retraining programmes.
In particular, my findings suggest that government programmes causing high-school
graduates to start training in instead of outside the occupation they will ultimately
work in would generate a net benefit up to a cost of 4, 500 Euros in 2010 for every
year participants will subsequently spend working on instead of off the diagonal.8
Moreover, using the 2010 empirical distribution of workers across training-occupation
cells, I find that over 50% of off-diagonal workers could be retrained without making
changes to the total number of apprentices trained in each occupation. In other
words, a substantial fraction of workers could have been trained in their current
7Differences arise with multiple occupation choices since workers would need to take into ac-
count the average payoffs across all occupation stages when choosing their training in a perfect
foresight environment. On the other hand, with costless retraining, training choices can be read-
justed each period. Given that the vast majority of workers works in at most two occupations, this
distinction is unlikely to matter in practice.
810% of an average of 45, 000 Euros in 2010. Assuming a discount factor of β, future work
years on the diagonal lead to a benefit of (4, 500× βt) Euros.
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occupation without changing occupation-specific training capacities. Policies could
include internships to provide information on own occupation-specific abilities or
workshops indicating occupations that may be in high demand in the foreseeable
future. While it is hard to know exactly how much additional information may
be provided through such initiatives, the figures suggest that only a very small
percentage of apprentices would need to make a better training choice for these
programmes to be cost-effective.
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